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NETWORKED CIVIL SOCIETY: THREE ESSAYS ON THE
GOVERNMENT–NONPROFIT RELATIONSHIP IN CHINA
This dissertation has two goals: 1) Introducing data science methodologies to non-
proﬁt studies; 2) Examining the impact of social relations on nonproﬁts’ social and
economic behaviors. Ultimately, this dissertation provides empirical evidence for a
new paradigm which is just in formation by a few scholars: a holistic network theory
of government–nonproﬁt relationship. Chapter 2 establishes a robust and general-
purpose database which has the potential to support the development of a research
topic. It also introduces the methodology for data management in contemporary
quantitative social science. Based on the database established, Chapter 3 approaches
the research question on nonproﬁt’s autonomy using network theory and ﬁnds that,
although nonproﬁt organizations in China may lose their autonomy because of govern-
ment oﬃcials on board, these organizations still enjoys a substantial level of freedom
in the organizational network. The Chinese nonproﬁt sector suggests the existence
of autonomous order theorized by political philosophers and observed in liberal so-
cieties. Chapter 4 reconsiders a classic research question in public economics – the
crowd-out/in eﬀect of government funding on private donations to nonproﬁts. This
chapter proposes an innovative theoretical perspective for understanding the role of
social relations in crowding mechanism: compensating mode and amplifying mode.
Analysis suggests that, although government funding to a nonproﬁt may crowd out
the private donations to the same organization, private donations are not reduced
but redistributed to other nonproﬁts in the organizational network. This chapter
also uses standardized data workﬂow to boost the research life-cycle, information
extraction techniques to construct structured dataset from semi-structured raw data
ﬁles, demonstrates how data science methodologies can help causal inference in classic
econometrics.
Richard Steinberg, Ph.D., Chair
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Chapter 1 Introduction: Toward a network theory of
government–nonproﬁt relationship
1.1 Conﬂict and Contingent: A Tale of Two Paradigms for Understanding the
Government–Nonproﬁt Relationship
While charities and “social organizations” appear early in China’s history, the major-
ity were closed during the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and 1970s (Ye, 2003). The
nonproﬁt sector only re-emerged during the reform era of the 1980s, as part of the
government’s push to decentralize and devolve power away from direct state control
(Q. Ma, 2002a; Teets, 2013). In the following decades, the sector has expanded so
rapidly that scholars today ask whether it represents the rise of a Chinese civil soci-
ety: a dense network of groups that bring together citizens to accomplish activities
outside of government control.
That concept, civil society, got popularity when Alexis de Tocqueville connected
the early stages of American democracy to the growth of voluntary associations of
ordinary citizens for everything from the promotion of temperance to the founding
of schools (de Tocqueville, 2012, Chapter 5). Ever since, political theorists and so-
ciologists have tried to understand the role that these associations might play in the
liberalization of authoritarian regimes and the early stages of democratic rule. The
concept of civil society has continued to evolve; in a recent study of the “illegal”
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)1 in China, Spires (2011) quotes Foley and
Edwards (1996) to describe a neo-Tocquevillian concept of civil society as “an au-
tonomous sphere of social power within which citizens can pressure authoritarians for
change, protect themselves from tyranny, and democratize from below.” For these
reasons, hardline members of the Chinese state leaders are liable to view the very
concept of civil society as a “trap” set by “Western countries” (Simon, 2013, p. xxx).
A central theme of research on the Chinese nonproﬁt world is thus how autonomous
nonproﬁts can be in the presence of state control (C. L. Hsu, 2010; Q. Ma, 2002b).
Yet the existence of non-governmental associations does not necessarily imply a
civil society in the Tocquevillian mode or even a threat to authoritarian rule. While
countries in the West have accepted nonproﬁts that operate independent of govern-
ment control, foundations in China must contend with a one-party system potentially
intolerant of organizations that might hold it accountable or draw attention to its de-
ﬁciencies, and that therefore strives to control and monitor it. Concerns about the
1Scholars use “NGO” and “nonproﬁt” in diﬀerent contexts, the former often seen in political
context, the latter in service deliver. This dissertation uses the two terms interchangeably.
1
lack of autonomy in the nonproﬁt sector have led many observers to talk in terms
of state-corporatism (Q. Ma, 2002a; Whiting, 1991), where the nonproﬁt sector is
an auxiliary and dependent system of the state. In Schmitter (1974, pp. 99–100)’s
classic deﬁnition, the relevant organizations in state-corporatism parallel those of gov-
ernment agencies, being “singular, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered, sectorally
compartmentalized, interest associations exercising representational monopolies.”
In general, civil society can be understood through a paradigm focused either
on conﬂict, or on contingent cooperation. The conﬂict paradigm assumes that the
state and non-state organizations have goals that are in fundamental tension. These
theories leave little room for extensive cooperation between the two sectors (Lester M
Salamon, 2006). In the particular case of Chinese nonproﬁts, the idea of civil society
as a challenge to state power can be found in Kang and Han (2008) which describes a
“system of graduated control” where the state exerts diﬀerent control strategies over
diﬀerent types of nonproﬁts, depending on the level of threat these extra-government
organizations are seen to pose.
By contrast, the contingent cooperation paradigm sees nonproﬁts as potential ser-
vice arms of the state, at times able to implement the state’s goals in a more eﬃcient
and eﬀective fashion. Spires (2011) popularized an account of this form, based around
the idea of a “contingent symbiosis” between government and nonproﬁts, in which il-
legal NGOs are allowed to operate as long as they relieve the state’s responsibilities for
social welfare. Another example is “consultative authoritarianism” which promotes
an “operationally autonomous civil society” and a “sophisticated authoritarianism
that uses more indirect tools of social control” (Teets, 2013, p. 36).
Because of the authoritarian political context in China, both paradigms tend to
be politicized and focus on how much autonomy the nonproﬁt sector can have in
the presence of state control (C. L. Hsu, 2010; J. Y. J. Hsu, Hsu, & Hasmath, 2017;
Kang & Han, 2008; Q. Ma, 2002b). This tendency is critical for understanding and
facilitating the democratic process in authoritarian countries, but the overwhelming
emphasis on political implications ignores the complex interactions between nonproﬁt
sector and state, sustaining a “theoretical poverty” in understanding the government–
nonproﬁt relationship (Salmenkari, 2013).
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1.2 Perspective from the United States: Supplementary, Complementary, and Ad-
versarial
The cultural and historical contexts in China are special, but the challenge for under-
standing the government–nonproﬁt relationship is not unique to this Eastern country.
In the United States where the term “nonproﬁt sector” was invented (Hall, 2006,
p. 50) and has produced most of the literature on nonproﬁt sector (J. Ma & Konrath,
2018), the relationship between government and nonproﬁt sector is an enduring and
fundamental research question because it tries to understand why nonproﬁt sector
exists.
This earliest dominant theory explaining the existence of nonproﬁt sector was the
“market failure / government failure” theory developed in the mid-1970s (Weisbrod,
1975, 1977). From this theoretical perspective, nonproﬁts exist because government
fails to provide enough public goods. This relationship is termed the “supplementary
relationship” and shares the rationale of the contingent paradigm in Chinese context.
The “complementary relationship” theorizes the partnership between nonproﬁt and
government: the nonproﬁt organizations and government departments work together
to deliver public goods. And the “adversarial relationship” views that nonproﬁts ad-
vocate changes in government’s behavior and make the government more accountable,
and reciprocally, the government regulates on nonproﬁts’ operations (Young, 2006,
pp. 39–40). The adversarial view is also similar to the conﬂict model in Chinese
studies.
The three views of government-nonproﬁt relationship are not rival but coexist. As
early as the Colonial period when the government was still primitive and limited in
capacity, the government–nonproﬁt relationship was supplementary since many of the
under-provided public goods were delivered through voluntary associations (Trattner,
1998, Chapter 2). During the New Deal and Great Society when the government took
more responsibilities in social welfare programs, the nonproﬁt sector also retained a
vital and increasing role in social welfare, suggesting the complementary partnership
between nonproﬁt and government (Lester M. Salamon, 1987). Other than delivering
social service and public goods, nonproﬁts also have an important role of advocacy
because they can represent the groups they served; meanwhile, the government puts
a series of regulations on nonproﬁts, limiting their ability to lobby (Berry & Arons,
2003). This suggests the adversarial relationship between nonproﬁt and government.
By examining American history, all these three types of relationships coexist in Amer-
ican history across all eras (Young, 2006, pp. 49–72).
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However, even in the US where scholars produce most of the literature on non-
proﬁt sector, the relationship between government–nonproﬁt is oversimpliﬁed, and
the theories used to understand the relationship is incomplete — there need to be
integrative and holistic theories of “social contract” which incorporates all the three
diﬀerent relationships (Lester M. Salamon, 2012; Young, 2006, pp. 72–76).
1.3 Bridging the Paradigms: Theorizing “the Sector” as an Intermediate Space and
Process
Both Chinese and American studies suggest the importance of a holistic theory of
the government-nonproﬁt relationship. Rather than theorizing the nonproﬁt orga-
nizations as an independent sector and social power with clear boundaries between
government and business, scholars suggest that it is more important to theorize the
interactions between diﬀerent social actors (i.e., nonproﬁt, government, and busi-
ness) as a social process and dialogue, emphasizing the interdependence rather than
independence (Corry, 2010, p. 15; Lester M. Salamon, 1995; Selsky & Parker, 2005).
Two recent studies on Chinese civil society are just in this trend. Teets (2017)
studied the policy networks created by civil society organizations in China and con-
tended that these networks function similarly to those in democracies. Within these
networks where ordinary citizens and government oﬃcials are all embedded, public
participation in the policy process becomes possible and inﬂuential. However, these
observations are largely ignored in the literature on policy process in authoritarian
countries. Yao Lu and Tao (2017) reevaluated the institutional basis for collective
action in China. They pointed out that the informal lineage groups form strong
“horizontal linkages” between citizens and can eﬀectively mobilize the resource for
collective action. Meanwhile, the civic organizations provide important “vertical link-
ages” which can complement the horizontal linkages with access to government oﬃ-
cials, and therefore facilitate the success of collective action. Their study challenged
the traditional notion that an organizational basis for collective action is absent in
nondemocratic counties.
1.4 A Holistic Theory of the Government-Nonproﬁt Relationship: Network Struc-
ture and Spontaneous Order
Previous studies have documented the strategies and tactics of individual nonproﬁts,
either through case studies or the identiﬁcation of qualitative patterns of behavior
across multiple cases (e.g., Estes, 1998; Yiyi Lu, 2007; Saich, 2000; Teets, 2013). Civil
4
society, however, is more than just the existence, and even the autonomy, of nonproﬁts
as individuals. It is how these organizations connect and cooperate with each other,
forming “suﬃcient horizontal linkages among various social actors to constitute a
civil society” (Salmenkari, 2013, p. 682): the organized “multiple overlapping and
intersecting sociospatial networks of power” (Mann, 1986, p. 1). The social actors
possess some unique properties at the network level which are diﬀerent from those at
the individual level and neglected by traditional approaches to government–nonproﬁt
relationship.
The network can organize social actors in two extreme settings. In the ﬁrst setting,
an ideal central agent possesses the complete knowledge of how to deal with changes
and issues orders in a timely fashion. In the second setting, all actors in society have
only the most relevant knowledge for making decisions on their own behalf. The
ﬁrst centralized setting can hardly work because a real agent can only possess the
incomplete knowledge and information, but the second decentralized setting is more
realistic in terms of using knowledge (von Hayek, 1945, p. 524).
An extreme example of the ﬁrst arrangement can be a highly centralized social
structure and planned economy, like the mainland China during Mao’s governance; an
extreme example of the second arrangement can be an atomistic-type society within
which there are prevailing interpersonal conﬂict and antagonism (Rubel & Kupferer,
1968). In between the two extreme structures, there is a polycentric social structure
organized by spontaneous orders (von Hayek, 2011, p. 230).
The spontaneous order is an important feature of the sociospatial network in a
liberal society. As Polanyi stated: “When order is achieved among human beings by
allowing them to interact with each other on their own initiative–subject only to the
laws which uniformly apply to all of them–we have a system of spontaneous order in
society” (Polanyi, 1951, p. 159).
The spontaneous order is an aggregation of individual action but not a result of
human intention (Barry, 1982, p. 8). It is critical for individuals in a liberal society
because “they are not determined by any speciﬁc command, whether of a superior
or a public authority; the compulsion to which they are subject is impersonal and
general” (Polanyi, 1951, p. 195). It should be improved as much as possible to protect
the freedom and restrict the use of coercion in a society (von Hayek, 2011).
To understand government-nonproﬁt relationships, we must study not only how
the state acts on individual nonproﬁts, but also how it interacts with the networks
through which these nonproﬁts share personnel, information, and resources. The
infrastructural power the state exercises may be both enhanced, and dissipated, by
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the horizontal connections between the organizations it penetrates. Moreover, the
network itself may have formed spontaneous orders which are beyond any party’s
control. The notion of spontaneous order goes beyond the traditional conception
of autonomy considered by existing theories explaining the government–nonproﬁt
relationship, but it is a crucial component for developing a liberal society.
1.5 Dissertation Contributions
This dissertation has two goals: 1) introducing data science methodologies to non-
proﬁt studies, and 2) examining the impact of social relations on nonproﬁts’ social
and economic behaviors. Ultimately, this dissertation provides empirical evidence for
a new paradigm which is just in formation by a few scholars: a holistic network the-
ory of government–nonproﬁt relationship. Although this dissertation is not the ﬁrst
literature approaching these topics, it provides detail and systematical examples of
applying data science and extending network analysis in nonproﬁt studies.
1.5.1 Introducing Data Science Methodologies
Data science can be deﬁned as “a set of fundamental principles that support and
guide the principled extraction of information and knowledge from data” ((Provost
& Fawcett, 2013, p. 52)). It overlaps with numerous other concepts in industry and
academia, for example, big data, data-driven decision making, data mining, and scien-
tiﬁc computing, etc. Data science also draws knowledge and methods from established
disciplines, for instance, it emphasizes the principles of causal inference in statistics
and heavily relies on computer science technologies (Provost & Fawcett, 2013).
In general, data science includes a set of skills and principles to achieve the fol-
lowing goals:
P.1 Data and data life-cycle management intends to standardize the workﬂow and
support the replication of results and reuse of data. Researchers concur that
there is a reproducibility crisis in contemporary natural and social science, that
is, many of the published results can hardly be replicated (Baker, 2016; King,
1995). Scientiﬁc advancement is built on the knowledge ground laid by past
works. The reproducibility crisis casts doubts on the foundations of scientiﬁc
disciplines.
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P.2 Extracting information from messy data which can be unstructured (e.g., a
poem), semi-structured (e.g., a grant proposal), or structured (e.g., census
data).
P.3 Innovative analysis methods, for example, network analysis for analyzing rela-
tional data, unsupervised machine learning using a training dataset, and real
time analysis of extremely large datasets which may be of terabyte or even
petabyte size.
P.4 Innovative knowledge extraction and representation methods, for example, data
visualization and user interaction.
Although these purposes are not unique to data science, traditional disciplines
only focus on one or few of them. This dissertation manifests the application of
all these skills and principles. Chapter 2, The Research Infrastructure of Chinese
Foundations, a database for Chinese civil society studies, is an example of P.1. It
establishes a robust and general-purpose database which has the potential to support
the development of a research area. Chapter 3, State power and elite autonomy in a
networked civil society: The board interlock of Chinese nonproﬁts, covers P.3 and P.4.
This chapter not only employs traditional methodologies in social science research
(e.g., operationalizing social concepts and regression analysis), it also makes use of
innovative analysis methods including network analysis, using simulations as a null
model, and visualizing the evolution of regression coeﬃcients. Chapter 4, Funding
nonproﬁts in a networked society: Two models of crowding mechanism of govern-
ment support, shows the application of P.1 and P.2. This chapter uses standardized
data workﬂow to boost the research life-cycle. It also uses information extraction
techniques to construct a structured dataset from semi-structured raw data ﬁles.
Moreover, this chapter demonstrates how data science methodologies can help the
statistical inference in classic econometrics.
1.5.2 Impact of Social Relations on Nonproﬁts
Although the “problem of embeddedness” (Granovetter, 1985) has been discussed
for decades, traditional and mainstream studies of organizational behavior still often
consider organizations as atomic individuals, ignoring the fact that these institutions
are embedded in and inﬂuenced by their social relations. As reviewed in the above
sections (Section 1.3 and 1.4), a holistic perspective and understanding of organi-
zational behavior is in demand. Network analysis has been greatly utilized in the
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last few decades to understand the organizational and personal behaviors in complex
networks (Borgatti, Mehra, Brass, & Labianca, 2009). Because of the exponential
increase in computational power, scholars are able to analyze the interactions among
thousands or even millions of actors. But network analysis is not only a quantitative
method, it is also a theoretical perspective (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011; Borgatti &
Lopez-Kidwell, 2011).
Social network analysis as a theoretical perspective. In the early 20th century,
the properties and inﬂuences of social relations had already been noticed by sociol-
ogists (e.g., Weber and Simmel). However, serious studies and formation of social
network conceptions were not developed until the mid-20th century (Scott, 1988,
p. 110). Most of these early classical studies did not use mathematical methods but
emphasize the theoretical and qualitative understanding: “there was something fun-
damentally wrong with a sociology which did not recognise and take seriously the
patterns created by social relations” (Scott, 1988, p. 111). For example, J. A. Barnes
(1954) anthropological study examined the important positions in social structure
for governing and organizing social life. Without relying on mathematical analysis,
Granovetter’s 1983 classic paper emphasized the critical functions of “weak ties.”
In general, these studies re-examined old questions from a theoretical perspective of
network and generated many innovative insights.
Social network analysis as a quantitative method. Social network analysis has
been exponentially extended since the 1960s and 1970s because of the development
of mathematical analysis (Scott, 1988, p. 111). Numerous metrics for measuring
the importance of nodes in networks were invented, for example, degree centrality,
betweenness centrality, closeness centrality, and page-rank (Freeman, 1977, 1978).
Social networks can also be analyzed mathematically by clusters, that is, some nodes
are preferentially attached to each other, forming sub-groups within a larger network
(Blondel, Guillaume, Lambiotte, & Lefebvre, 2008; Newman & Girvan, 2004). There
are also metrics for describing the properties of a network, for example, the pattern
of nodes’ degree distribution, graph density measuring the connectedness of nodes,
and rich-club coeﬃcient which indicates the existence of elite groups in a network
(Borgatti, Everett, & Johnson, 2013; Scott, 2013).
This dissertation provides examples of applying social network analysis from both
theoretical and mathematical perspectives. Chapter 3 approaches the research ques-
tion on NGO’s autonomy using network theory and ﬁnds that, although nonproﬁt
organizations in China may lose their autonomy because of the appearance of govern-
ment oﬃcials on board, these organizations still enjoy a substantial level of freedom in
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an organizational network. By using advanced mathematics and statistics, this chap-
ter also quantitatively analyzes the degree and emergence of network autonomy. From
a theoretical network perspective, Chapter 4 reconsiders a classic research question in
public economics — the crowd-out eﬀect of government funding on private donations
to nonproﬁts and proposes new perspectives considering the impact of social relations
on economic behavior.
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Chapter 2 The Research Infrastructure of Chinese Foundations, a
database for Chinese civil society studies
This chapter provides technical details and user guidance on the Research Infrastruc-
ture of Chinese Foundations (RICF), a database of Chinese foundations, civil society,
and social development in general. The structure of the RICF is deliberately designed
and normalized according to the Three Normal Forms. The database schema consists
of three major themes: a basic organizational proﬁle of foundations (i.e., basic pro-
ﬁle, board member, supervisor, staﬀ, and related party tables), program information
(i.e., program information, major program, program relationship, and major recipient
tables), and ﬁnancial information (i.e., ﬁnancial position, ﬁnancial activities, cash
ﬂow, activity overview, and large donation tables). The RICF’s data quality can be
measured by four criteria: data source reputation and credibility, completeness, ac-
curacy, and timeliness. Data records are properly versioned, allowing veriﬁcation and
replication for research purposes.2
2.1 Introduction
Scholarly interest in civil society in contemporary China began in the mid-1980s,
especially after the 1989 Tiananmen Incident (Chamberlain, 1993). Studies on Chi-
nese civil society have various theoretical and practical implications, for example, the
state–society relationship and the democratization process in China. However, al-
though China is becoming an important and rapidly growing political and economic
power, our knowledge about Chinese civil society remains limited. The majority of
previous studies on Chinese civil society are dominated by paradigms originating in
Western political philosophy or the so-called “Anglosphere” cultures (Bennett, 2007),
for example, the “conﬂicting” paradigm, which regards civil society as a necessary
power to check the state, or the “state-corporatism” paradigm, which considers civil
society as a dependency of the state (Spires, 2011). However, none of these paradigms
can provide suﬃcient explanations for understanding Chinese civil society. The lack
of cultural diversity and indigenous paradigms is a major challenge but little progress
has been made since the 1980s (Madsen, 1993; Salmenkari, 2013).
2A published version of this chapter is co-authored with: Qun Wang, Chao Dong, and Huafang
Li. Author contributions: J.M. designed the database, developed the codebook and codes for geocod-
ing, and wrote the paper. Q.W. developed the codebook, wrote the paper, and managed data quality.
C.D. wrote the ﬁrst draft of the technical validation section. H.L. revised the paper and promoted
the database.
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A major challenge for making progress on this research topic is the lack of data for
empirical studies on which new theories can be built and tested. In the United States,
data extracted from Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 990 Forms (Form 990, Form 990-
EZ, Form 990-PF, and Form 990-N) has boosted knowledge production on civil society
and the nonproﬁt sector. However, unlike the United States, where there are numer-
ous institutions that provide database services to scholars (e.g., GuideStar, Urban
Institute, and Foundation Center, etc.), few counterparts in China have emerged and
none of them can adequately serve academic research —- the datasets are neither
structured for research purposes nor easily accessible.
In responding to this critical data scarcity challenge, we built a database for
studying Chinese foundations – the Research Infrastructure of Chinese Foundations
parenRICF). The foundation (jijinhui) is one of the three organizational forms of
registered NGOs. The other two are membership-based association (shehui tuanti)
and social service organization (shehui fuwu jigou, formerly named as minban feiqiye
danwei). Among these three organizational forms, foundations are the most developed
organizational form and dominant civic power in China, and they are critical for
strategically preserving the autonomy of civil society from state control ( J. Ma and
DeDeo, 2018). Empirical studies about Chinese foundations can generate important
theoretical and practical implications for Chinese non-governmental organizations
and civil society. For example, the board interlock analysis using RICF discovers the
contingent relationship between state power and business elites, and this relationship
provides empirical evidence for a new paradigm of “networked civil society” within
which networked multipolar groups share power and achieve an equilibrium rather
than behaving independently (J. Ma & DeDeo, 2018). A critical discourse analysis
using RICF reveals that the Chinese government tends to co-opt foundations formed
by ﬁrms and entrepreneurs. These foundations can generate suﬃcient funding from
their founding ﬁrms and entrepreneurs. However, the government tends to restrict
the activities of foundations that use diverse revenue strategies (Q. Wang, 2016).
This diﬀerentiated control mechanism challenges the dominant “conﬂicting paradigm”
pareni.e., state power always conﬂicts with civic power) in the Western world ( Lester
M. Salamon, 2012). A multilevel analysis using RICF suggests that the distribution of
resources is highly imbalanced among foundations and that some types of foundations
are more capable of mobilizing resources (Wei, 2017).
This chapter intends to help scholars understand and make the best use of RICF.
It introduces the database structure, how the data is validated, the data collection
procedure, and the data quality control workﬂow.
11
2.2 Methods
The database structure of RICF is designed and normalized by adhering to the Three
Normal Forms paren3NFs) – a series of rules for organizing the attributes within a
table and the relationships between diﬀerent tables ( Codd, 1970). As Figure 2.1
illustrates, the database schema consists of three major themes: a basic organiza-
tional proﬁle of foundations (i.e., basic proﬁle, board member, supervisor, staﬀ, and
related party tables), program information (i.e., program information, major program,
program relationship, and major recipient tables), and ﬁnancial information (i.e., ﬁ-
nancial position, ﬁnancial activities, cash ﬂow, activity overview, and large donation
tables). The primary key (PK) in each table is a unique identiﬁer, and the foreign
key (FK) is used to establish connections between diﬀerent tables. For example, the
ricf_oid in the basic proﬁle table is a PK that records the organizations’ unique IDs,
but in the program information table, it is an FK to link back to the basic proﬁle
table; therefore, while analyzing programs, scholars can use this data ﬁeld to retrieve
the organization’s proﬁle.
The data are crawled, parsed, and compiled manually or automatically by com-
puter programs (Python Scrapy and other data processing packages, e.g., Pandas)
from the following six sources ranked by their credibility:
S.1 Annual reports and audited ﬁnancial reports. Chinese foundations are required
to submit their annual reports to the civil aﬀairs departments with which they
are registered. These reports can be obtained from the foundations’ or the
government’s oﬃcial websites. The addresses of foundations’ oﬃcial websites
are recorded under ba_wb in the basic proﬁle table.
S.2 Information disclosed by supervising government departments. For example,
annual ﬁling disclosed by the Civil Organization Administration Bureau of the
Ministry of Civil Aﬀairs3 and the Shanghai Administration Bureau of NGOs4,
among others. The Ministry of Civil Aﬀairs5 has a list of websites of supervising
government departments.
S.3 Information disclosed by the China Foundation Database6.
3http://jjh.chinanpo.gov.cn
4http://xxgk.shstj.gov.cn/
5http://www.mca.gov.cn/
6http://chinafoundation.org.cn; an information-disclosing platform supervised by the Civil Or-
ganization Administration Bureau, closed in early 2016 for unknown reasons
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Figure 2.1: Database schema of Research Infrastructure of Chinese Foundations.
Note: PK = Primary Key; FK = Foreign Key. Only primary keys and foreign keys are listed in the
Schema; refer to the codebook for complete data ﬁelds.
S.4 Information disclosed by the China Foundation Center7.
S.5 News from the foundation’s oﬃcial website. The website snapshots are taken
and stored under the raw_data folder (see Data Records section below; the same
for S.6).
S.6 News from credible magazines or websites.
2.2.1 Code availability
The raw data are processed using Python 2.x. For users’ convenience, we geocode
the foundation’s address using Python geocoding package Geocoder8 and following
two settings: 1) ArcGIS is preferred because of precision, and 2) the addresses not
7http://foundationcenter.org.cn; an information-disclosing platform run by a nonproﬁt organi-
zation
8https://geocoder.readthedocs.io
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successfully geocoded by ArcGIS are recoded by Google GIS. Codes for geocoding
are available at GitHub9
2.2.2 Data Records
The development version of the data is available at GitHub9. Under the root reposi-
tory, we named and organized folders and ﬁles as follows:
1 Foundation data records are organized by year (e.g., folders named 2013 and
2014). Each ﬁle represents a table in the database schema (Figure 2.1). The
data ﬁles are tab-delimited and use UTF-8 encoding.
2 codes: this folder contains codes for particular purposes, e.g., codes for geocod-
ing.
3 raw data: this folder contains raw materials from which the data are extracted,
e.g., annual reports and website snapshots.
4 RICF codebook.xlsx: Codebook in MS Excel format.
5 how to cite.bib: Citation information of RICF.
6 ricf_oid: A Python function for looking up organization identity information
(RICF unique ID, foundation name, and Uniﬁed Social Credit Code).
7 README.md: General instructions.
All revisions are properly logged using GitHub’s version control function. Users
can easily track the changes or revert to a speciﬁc version. Once we start to release
the data tables of a speciﬁc year parene.g., 2013), a stable version is published on
GitHub and updated on Harvard Dataverse (Data Citation; ﬁles are tagged with
version names described below). The stable version contains all the repositories and
ﬁles except the raw data and codes folders.
The version name is formatted as v.Year.MajorRevision.MinorRevision for the pur-
pose of version control. The Year ﬁeld indicates the year for which the most recent
records are available. For example, 2014 means that the most recent records in this
release are from 2014 and that this version also contains earlier records that date back
to 2013. The MajorRevision ﬁeld is updated when new data tables are added to the
package.
In doing so, we can strike a balance between the timeliness of research and the
accuracy of data. If we release a stable version only when all the data tables of a year
9https://github.com/ma-ji/RICF
14
are ready, it will not satisfy timely research demands. Moreover, scholars often use
only a small proportion of the data tables. Therefore, releasing stable versions table
by table instead of year by year should achieve a better balance between timeliness
of research and accuracy of data. The MinorRevision ﬁeld is updated when erroneous
records are corrected.
2.3 Technical Validation
2.3.1 Data Quality Dimensions
Data quality is usually deﬁned as “ﬁtness for use by data consumers” (R. Y. Wang
& Strong, 1996) and relates not only to the content of data but also to the way that
data are utilized and whether data consumers are satisﬁed with using data for their
purposes. The diverse nature of data quality results in many data quality dimensions
derived from diﬀerent needs.
Four typical dimensions have signiﬁcant impacts on the goal of RICF: data source
reputation and credibility, completeness, accuracy, and timeliness (Dong, Sampaio,
& Sampaio, 2006). This section introduces how these four dimensions are employed
to measure the extent to which RICF is reliable, complete, accurate, and timely.
2.3.2 Data Source Reputation and Credibility
Data source reputation refers to whether the data source is in high standing; credibil-
ity is the degree to which the data are considered true and credible to data consumers
(Naumann, 2002; R. Y. Wang & Strong, 1996) The combination of reputation and
credibility indicates whether the data can be trusted and represents the way in which
the data source convinces data consumers that the data are considered to be true and
credible (R. Y. Wang & Strong, 1996)
The RICF data are collected from the six diﬀerent sources listed above. These
sources are ranked by their reputation and credibility. When conﬂicts occur, the
rankings will be used for the evaluation of accuracy. For instance, when a piece of
information about an organization from Source S.2 contradicts the same information
from Source S.1, RICF uses information from Source S.1 rather than that from lower
ranks.
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2.3.3 Completeness
The completeness of data in RICF is deﬁned as “the extent to which data are of
suﬃcient breadth, depth, and scope for the task at hand” (Pipino, Lee, & Wang,
2002, p. 212)) or “the quotient of the number of non-null values in a source and the
size of the universal relation” (Naumann, 2002, p. 31)). The universal relation is
that consisting of all attributes of the global schema. RICF considers three types of
completeness in the design process:
1. Schema completeness refers to the degree to which the proﬁles of a source (e.g.,
entities and attributes) are not missing from the database schema. This type
of completeness is controlled and can be evaluated by the Database Schema of
the RICF (Figure 2.1).
2. Column completeness measures the integrity of columns in a table. It is also
known as attribute completeness in the relational database. This type of com-
pleteness is controlled by the RICF codebook.
3. Population completeness measures the integrity of observations compared to a
reference population. Table 2.1 provides two other data sources for evaluating
the RICF’s population completeness.
A major resource for determining and improving the schema and column complete-
ness is the Chinese foundations’ annual reports. The Regulations on the Management
of Foundations(PRC State Council, 2004) requires all foundations to submit annual
reports to the civil aﬀairs departments with which they are registered. The annual
reports contain three main types of information:
1. Organizational and operational proﬁles, including personnel, board of directors,
board of supervisors, annual evaluation results, tax exemption status, etc.
2. Financial information, such as assets, donation income, and expenses, etc. The
ﬁnancial information should have been audited by a qualiﬁed accounting ﬁrm
before submission.
3. Project summaries that report the focuses of projects, beneﬁciaries, and funding
received and spent, etc.
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Table 2.1: Population of foundations recorded by diﬀerent sources: RICF, China
Statistical Yearbook parenYearbook), and China Foundation Center (CFC). Sources:
China Statistical Yearbook 2017 (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2017), The
2014 Statistical Report of Social Service Development (PRC Ministry of Civil Aﬀairs,
2015), and The CFC Independent Research Report (China Foundation Center, 2016).
Year RICF Yearbook CFC
1981 5 NA 8
1982 13 NA 15
1983 22 NA 16
1984 30 NA 22
1985 40 NA 36
1986 59 NA 54
1987 68 NA 66
1988 96 NA 94
1989 140 NA 140
1990 161 NA 162
1991 184 NA 185
1992 264 NA 261
1993 325 NA 320
1994 394 NA 388
1995 463 NA 453
1996 502 NA 490
1997 525 NA 506
Year RICF Yearbook CFC
1998 535 NA 515
1999 545 NA 526
2000 552 NA 539
2001 568 NA 554
2002 587 NA 572
2003 614 954 597
2004 695 892 745
2005 832 975 891
2006 982 1,144 1,056
2007 1,188 1,340 1,280
2008 1,416 1,597 1,533
2009 1,665 1,843 1,826
2010 2,040 2,200 2,213
2011 2,430 2,614 2,608
2012 2,880 3,029 3,009
2013 3,344 3,549 3,627
2014 4,233 4,117 4,211
2.3.4 Accuracy
Accuracy refers to the closeness of a value to another value that is considered correct
(Redman, 1997). Regarding accuracy, a data value must be correct and stored in a
proper form parene.g., consistent and unambiguous); therefore, both the content of
data and form of storage are indispensable for accuracy (Olson, 2003). RICF uses
three approaches to improve data accuracy:
1. Triangulation using data from diﬀerent sources. All the source ﬁles used in
compiling the data are retained for reference.
2. Ranking priorities for reputation and credibility of the data sources discussed
in the previous section.
3. Normalization using 3NF rules to maintain the integrity and consistency of the
stored data.
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2.3.5 Timeliness
Timeliness measures the extent to which the data are suﬃciently timely. Two concepts
are important for timeliness: currency and volatility. Currency is deﬁned as “the age
of the data when it is delivered to users.” Volatility refers to “the length of time during
which the data remain valid” (Ballou, Wang, Pazer, & Tayi, 1998). For instance, a
grocery store may need to update the transaction data daily to generate a timely
sales report and provide critical information for inventory.
Timeliness is highly dependent on the scenarios in which the data will be used.
Most of the data in RICF are static data, that is, data that may not be updated
during their lifetime (e.g., name of the foundation and registration number, etc.)
and seldom-updated data (annual income and expenses, etc.). The volatility is long,
and for our research purposes, the currency does not need to be as short as daily or
monthly. Therefore, the RICF has a comprehensive update scheduled once a year,
and the currency is set as one year. For example, the 2015 annual data of most
foundations were released and available to us around August 2016 (i.e., data became
available on foundations’ websites or government’s websites), and RICF then will
compile and release these data one year later, that is, around August 2017.
At this stage, the four-dimension evaluations —- data source reputation and cred-
ibility, completeness, accuracy, and timeliness —- can eﬀectively serve the research
interests of Chinese foundations and Chinese civil society in general.
2.3.6 Null values
Another important issue is how to address null values, which usually indicate missing
values. However, it is important to understand the reasons for missing values because
it is relevant to the evaluation of completeness. A value may be missing on three
occasions: 1) the value does not exist; 2) the value exists but is unavailable; and 3)
it is unknown whether the value exists or not (Atzeni & De Antonellis, 1993) The
word “exist” is deﬁned here from an ontological perspective. Whether a value exists
is not judged by the availability of data but rather by reasoning. While developing
the codebook according to the rule of column completeness, all of the foundations are
expected to have values for all the variables. Therefore, conditions 1 and 3 are not
applicable to RICF. All the null values fall under condition 2.
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Table 2.2: Validating data using diﬀerent sources. Note: All numbers except for
sample size (N) are in ten million Chinese Yuan (CNY). CFC = China Foundation
Center; RICF = Research Infrastructure of Chinese Foundations.
Total Income Total Donation Income Total Expense Net Asset
RICF CFC
N 2762 3136
Mean 1.39 1.30
SD 7.21 6.80
CI Upper 1.66 1.54
CI Lower 1.12 1.06
RICF CFC
2762 3136
1.15 1.08
6.22 5.87
1.38 1.28
0.92 0.87
RICF CFC
2762 3124
1.01 0.94
6.25 5.90
1.24 1.15
0.78 0.74
RICF CFC
2907 3134
3.15 3.01
13.45 12.99
3.64 3.46
2.66 2.55
2.4 Validation Experiments
We did two experiments to test the validity of the data: the descriptive and regression
experiments.
Descriptive Experiment. We calculated the descriptive statistics of selected vari-
bles using one of the data sources and compared the results with RICF (Table 2.2).
The 95% coeﬃcent intervals suggest that the distributions of these varibles, although
from diﬀerent sources, are largely overlapped.
Regression experiments. In one of our empirical studies, we hand-coded one of
the variables, that is, the number of government oﬃcials on foundations’ boards (J.
Ma & DeDeo, 2018). The regression results using RICF and hand-coded dataset are
congruent with each other.
2.5 Usage Notes
Users may face the encoding problem of Chinese characters. All the records use
UTF-8 and are tab-separated. Please pay special attention while importing ﬁles.
2.6 Data Citation
Ma, J., Wang, Q., Dong, C., & Li, H. (2017a). The Research Infrastructure of Chinese
Foundations, a database for Chinese civil society studies. 00011. doi:10.7910/
DVN/OTNI1L.
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Chapter 3 State power and elite autonomy in a networked civil society:
The board interlock of Chinese nonproﬁts
In response to failures of central planning, the Chinese government has experimented
not only with free-market trade zones, but with allowing nonproﬁt foundations to
operate in a decentralized fashion. A network study shows how these foundations have
connected together by sharing board members, in a structural parallel to what is seen
in corporations in the United States and Europe. This board interlock leads to the
emergence of an elite group with privileged network positions. While the presence of
government oﬃcials on nonproﬁt boards is widespread, government oﬃcials are much
less common in a subgroup of foundations that control just over half of all revenue in
the network. This subgroup, associated with business elites, not only enjoys higher
levels of within-elite links, but even preferentially excludes government oﬃcials from
the NGOs with higher degree. The emergence of this structurally autonomous sphere
is associated with major political and social events in the state-society relationship.
Cluster analysis reveals multiple internal components within this sphere that share
similar levels of network inﬂuence. Rather than a core-periphery structure centered
around government oﬃcials, the Chinese nonproﬁt world appears to be a multipolar
one of distinct elite groups, many of which achieve high levels of independence from
direct government control.10
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Board Interlock and State Power
When the boards of diﬀerent organizations have members in common—when their
boards interlock—they can synchronize both their values and behaviors in the absence
of explicit central control (Davis & Greve, 1997; Dreiling & Darves, 2011; Fennema
& Schijf, 1978; Mintz & Schwartz, 1981; Mizruchi, 1996). Organizations that share
key members in this fashion can reap the beneﬁts of network connections and solve
coordination problems (Faulk, Willems, McGinnis Johnson, & Stewart, 2015; Pombo
& Gutie´rrez, 2011).
Board interlock is widespread in free-market societies, where it emerges in the busi-
ness sector as means for coordinating decisions and building social inﬂuence (Davis,
10A published version of this chapter is co-authored with: Simon DeDeo. J.M. compiled the
dataset, designed the study, analyzed the data and wrote the paper; S.D. designed the study, ana-
lyzed the data and wrote the paper. All numbers and theories are cross-checked by both authors.
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1996). In many countries, it spans multiple sectors, and links together the non-
proﬁt, commercial, and political worlds (R. C. Barnes, 2017; Moore, Sobieraj, Whitt,
Mayorova, & Beaulieu, 2002). In the donation-based charity sector, board interlock
helps coordinate of eﬀorts and share of information (Galaskiewicz, Bielefeld, & Dow-
ell, 2006), and enhances both a nonproﬁt’s perceived legitimacy and its capacity to
acquire resources (Esparza & Jeon, 2013). Among ethnic associations, the “broker
function” of board interlock generates and spreads political trust, helping to build
stronger civic communities and strengthening trust towards government (Fennema &
Tillie, 2001).
Much less is known about the political implications of board interlock under au-
thoritarian governments. For a government concerned with the dangers of indepen-
dent agents, interlock may be a beneﬁt, because the resulting coordination reduce
the independence between organizations and make non-government agents easier to
control. However, these beneﬁts exist only if the government maintains control of
the most central organizations in the resulting network. If it does not, board inter-
lock may shift from an opportunity to a threat: organizations may not only reap the
beneﬁts of coordination, but now do so by coordinating around an independent agent.
Board interlock is crucial to understanding “infrastructural” forms of state power
(Mann, 1984). Infrastructural power refers to the capacity of the state to act through
civil society, by penetrating, and thereby inﬂuencing, its institutions. Infrastruc-
tural power is often contrasted with despotic power: the ability of state elites to
act without formal negotiations with civil society, through top-down, unilateral ac-
tion. The coordination enabled by board interlock provides an important means by
which a state might amplify infrastructural power—or, conversely, a means by which
non-governmental actors may reduce it.
The world of nonproﬁt foundations in the People’s Republic of China provides
a key test case for how a central authority confronts the challenges of an emergent
network of non-governmental organizations. In short: how does an authoritarian
regime deal with the counter-power that may develop when agents of a putative civil
society connect together?
3.1.2 Networked Civil Society
As brieﬂy reviewed in Chapter 1.1, researches of Chinese nonproﬁt sector tend to
focus on how much autonomy can exist in the presence of state control(C. L. Hsu,
2010; J. Y. J. Hsu et al., 2017; Kang & Han, 2008; Q. Ma, 2002b). Previous studies
have documented the strategies and tactics of individual nonproﬁts, either through
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case studies or the identiﬁcation of qualitative patterns of behavior across multiple
cases (Estes, 1998; Yiyi Lu, 2007; Saich, 2000; Teets, 2013).
Civil society, however, is more than just the existence, and even the autonomy, of
non-governmental organizations as individuals. It is how these organizations connect
together, in a horizontal fashion, to form something more than a catalog of distinct
endeavors (Salmenkari, 2013): organized “multiple overlapping and intersecting so-
ciospatial networks of power” ( (Mann, 1986, p. 1)).
To understand civil society in China, in other words, we must study not only how
the state acts on individual foundations, but also how it interacts with the networks
through which these foundations share personnel, information, and resources. The
infrastructural power the state exercises may be both enhanced, and dissipated, by
the horizontal connections between the organizations it penetrates. Board interlock
is one of the primary mechanisms for this self-organization to take place, and yet we
know next to nothing about how this process has unfolded, and the implications of
this evolution for civil society in twenty-ﬁrst century China.
We studied the Chinese state-society relationship by looking at the evolution of
the nonproﬁt board interlock network. To do this, we draw on a large dataset of
oﬃcially-registered nonproﬁt foundations. This dataset records not only important
information about each foundation, but also the list of board members, enabling us
to construct the board interlock network. Our analysis can then operate at two levels
simultaneously: (1) at the level of the individual foundation, and (2) at the level of
the network, where edges between foundations are deﬁned by the sharing of board
members.
At the level of individual foundations, our data show the high level of presence of
government oﬃcials on foundation boards. Examination of how the number of gov-
ernment oﬃcials varies by working areas and foundation type shows how the presence
of government oﬃcials correlates with activities, and legal status, that the government
is expected to be most concerned to control.
At the network level, we ﬁnd that board appointments connect together a signiﬁ-
cant fraction of legal Chinese foundations into a single network. Our results show the
existence of network elites, associated with business entrepreneurs and their founda-
tions, that form preferential ties to each other. This subnetwork appears to prefer-
entially exclude government oﬃcials from its most central nodes, providing evidence
that the network acts in part to frustrate the magniﬁcation of state control that might
be expected to arise in the presence of board interlock.
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The sharing of board members not only connects foundations together, it also
appears to preferentially connect them into clusters: groups of nodes that, taken
together, tend to preferentially connect to each other rather than the other nodes in
the network. This phenomenon has been studied quantitatively by Heemskerk and
Takes (2016), for the case of the board interlock network among large corporations.
In that study, the authors were particularly interested to determine whether the
interlock network showed either a classical “core-periphery” structure based around
a single hegemon, or evidence for a the existence of a more “multipolar global order”.
Such an analysis has a natural analog to the question of the extent of civil society
within a nation: do foundations interlock with a government-controlled core, or do
they associate into independent structures with central positions that rival that of any
putative hegemonic core? We ﬁnd strong evidence for the latter, detecting distinct
clusters at the very center of the network. These clusters show a strong bimodaility in
levels of government control, either preferentially excluding, or including, government
oﬃcials. The Chinese nonproﬁt world is a multipolar one, with diﬀerent groups at
the center showing distinct relationships to government control.
Taken together, our ﬁndings suggest the emergence of a form of network auton-
omy that exists despite high levels of individual-level government appointments to
nonproﬁt boards. At the same time, the association of this network autonomy with
the business elite—rather than “ordinary” citizens—means that this autonomy may
not lead to the kind of pluralism associated with a Tocquevillian civil society.
3.2 Methods
3.2.1 Dataset and Network Construction
Our primary dataset is the Research Infrastructure of Chinese Foundations (J. Ma,
Wang, Dong, & Li, 2017b, RICF). The RICF database contains the records of the
3,344 legally-registered foundations within mainland China between 1981 and 2013.
Information about each foundation is drawn from six diﬀerent sources, including
both oﬃcial government reports and information submitted to the government, or
reported on websites, by the foundations themselves. Comparing RICF’s counts to
other reference sources, the RICF’s data appears to be at least 90% complete.
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While these foundations are outnumbered by the much larger number of less formal
“associations”, they are the most developed form of nonproﬁt institution, and control
just over 76% of all nonproﬁt funding in the nation.11
RICF strives to be as comprehensive as possible; it includes foundations that
may, for example, may be essentially defunct. Within RICF data is a subset of
foundations that have undergone an evaluation process, which rates the foundations
according to a set of criteria including governance structure, ﬁnancial transparency,
and program eﬀectiveness. Foundations which receive a “3A” or above (3A+) are
considered to have passed this evaluation. Because the 3A+ evaluation includes checks
on transparency and reporting, we expect the data associated with 3A+ foundations
to be more reliable; because it also includes checks on eﬀectiveness and governance,
we expect these foundations to be more active. Comparing our analyses with the 3A+
set allows us to test for unexpected sensitivities to both data quality, and foundation
activity levels, in the database as a whole.
For each foundation, RICF logs the names, gender, and date of birth of the board
members. This allows us to resolve name collision and therefore construct the board
interlock network: two foundations are connected when they share one (or more)
board members. For simplicity in this analysis, our network is unweighted: we
consider only the presence or absence of at least one shared member, and do not
distinguish whether links are created by sharing presidents, secretaries, or ordinary
members. Extensions to the study of weighted ties are certainly possible: one could,
for example, consider weighting the edge by the number of board members shared.
Such a weighting would add additional methodological complexities, however, since
foundations with larger boards will have the ability to form stronger ties with each
other. This may or may not correctly represent the underlying social dynamics: if
two foundations with very large boards share two members, it may not make sense to
represent them has having stronger ties to each other compared to two foundations
with very small boards and only a single member in common. One could attempt to
normalize the weights by board size; in the case, however, that the two foundations
so connected have diﬀerent sizes, we now have asymmetric edge weights. More so-
phisticated models yet could be constructed, on the basis of a probabilistic model for
connection formation: for example, one could consider edge weight relative to a null
model where ties are formed at random. In this analysis, for both simplicity and to
11The 3,344 foundations in the RICF database control approximately 35.3 billion RMB (B);
this amounts to a large fraction of the 45.9 B of nonproﬁt funding, tracked by the Ministry of Civil
Aﬀairs of China in 2013, for all “associations” and related classiﬁcations (Ministry of Civil Aﬀairs
of the PRC, 2014).
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allow direct comparison to prior literature in other areas of the world, we follow the
standard choice of unweighted edges.
The RICF data also contains the date of incorporation for each foundation, al-
lowing us to study how the ﬁnal network assembled over time. Inconsistencies in
historical reporting rates and availability of data make it diﬃcult, if not impossible,
to produce an exact history of entrances and departures over time. We can, however,
approximate this process by seeing how the network would have assembled if the
foundation’s board had remained unchanged to the present.
This is only an imperfect tracer of the more detailed question that includes both
the formation of a foundation, and the ways in which the network might be altered
by the addition or removal of board members. However, prior work suggests that this
approximation may not be that bad. A study of nonproﬁts in Spain found that initial
boards were usually assembled by the founders, and that while nonproﬁts needed a
period of development to attract outsiders as potential board members (de Andre´s-
Alonso, Azofra-Palenzuela, & Romero-Merino, 2009), this early growth appeared to
stop when the nonproﬁt reached maturity. A study in the United Kingdom found that
the majority of nonproﬁt boards remained unchanged on timescales of three years, and
that it was diﬃcult for to recruit new board members (Cornforth & Simpson, 2002).
Little is known about the Chinese case, however; where relevant, we draw attention
to cases where “the structure at time t, given board compositions in 2015” is only
an approximation, at best, to “the structure at time t, given board compositions at
time t”. In general, our dynamical analysis is limited to asking questions of the form
“when did organizations responsible for the current trend join the system?”.
3.2.2 Variables
Four critical variables help us characterize foundations at the individual level.
Public Fundraising vs. Non-Public Fundraising. The main legal distinctions in
the Chinese nonproﬁt sector governs the scope of fundraising. “Public fundraising”
foundations are allowed to raise money from the general public—for example, through
fund drives and advertising—while “non-public fundraising” foundations may not (as
shorthand, we refer to these as “public” and “non-public” hereafter). Moreover,
public foundations are further constrained by geography; “central-level” foundations
may raise funds at the national scale, while province-level and city-level foundations
are restricted geographically. The Chinese Charity Law, eﬀective from 1 September
2016, will nullify the distinction between public and non-public fundraising; however,
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the ability of organizations to raise funds from general public will still be controlled
by license issued from the state.12
Politically Sensitive vs. Politically Non-Sensitive. We supplement the RICF by
hand-coding the foundations’ mission statements by whether or not they are in-
volved in a potentially controversial or politically sensitive area (“sensitive” vs. “non-
sensitive”). Tracking this variable allows us to look for systematic attempts to selec-
tively control certain topics. If a foundation has one or more of the following charac-
teristics it is coded as “sensitive,” otherwise it is coded as “non-sensitive” (Dai, 2008;
Jiao, 2001; Kang & Han, 2008; Spires, 2011):
1. Involving advocacy, e.g., human rights, labor issues, and environmental policy.
2. Involving international aﬀairs, e.g., programs promoting international cultural
exchanges.
3. Involving religious or ethnic issues, e.g., Christian activities and Tibet issues.
4. Involving the police or the legal system, or related “social stability” (weiwen)
issues.
In order to control the researchers’ bias toward coding, two assistants, who were
unaware of the research purpose, were asked to independently classify foundations,
solely according to the information provided in their mission statements. Discrep-
ancies between the two assistants were ﬁnalized by a third person who is a doctoral
candidate in China studies.
State Power. Our main tracker of state penetration into the nonproﬁt sector is
the number of government oﬃcials in senior management positions. The presence of
government oﬃcials on a foundation board is a clear mechanism by which the state
can exercise control; at the same time the state, at least explicitly, forbids government
oﬃcials from serving on these boards. Oﬃcial law (Article 23) is that “principals” (the
board chair (president), deputy chair, or secretary general) should not be currently
employed by the state.13
Law against direct government involvement are commonly violated. The standard
annual reporting forms even asks foundations to report the number of principals who
12Xinhua News Agency: NPC hopes charity law can help poverty ﬁght, available at http://news.
xinhuanet.com/english/2016-03/09/c 135172544.htm, last accessed June 14, 2016.
13“Regulations on the Management of Foundations” (4 February 2004), Article
23; original text available at http://www.mca.gov.cn/article/yw/shjzgl/fgwj/201507/
20150700850200.shtml, see English translation at http://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/
regulations-on-the-management-of-foundations-chinese-text, last accessed 18 April 2016.
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Table 3.3: Foundation status, activity, and yearly budgets (in billions of yuan; 1 B ≈
150 M$ in 2016) for the 3,344 foundations in our database. The majority of the
foundations are concerned with neutral (non-sensitive) activities, and the majority
are restricted to private fundraising. Despite the fact that non-public foundations
can not raise money from the general public, they actually control the majority of
nonproﬁt revenue in the network.
Total Numbers Yearly Income
Non-sensitive Sensitive
Public 954 (28%) 356 (11%)
Non-Public 1913 (57%) 121 (3%)
Non-sensitive Sensitive
13.9 B 3.2 B
17.5 B 0.7 B
are government staﬀ; a non-negligible fraction (18%) report non-zero numbers of cur-
rent government oﬃcials. As a diﬀerent measure of state inﬂuence, we hand-coded
the 3A+ foundations, noting whether or not the board president is a current or re-
tired government oﬃcial. Hand-coding is a diﬃcult and laborious task; because it
can be diﬃcult to ascertain the current status of individual, our 3A hand-coding in-
cludes both retired and currently-serving government oﬃcials, and is thus not directly
comparable to the self-reporting set.
We thus count the number of government oﬃcials in three diﬀerent ways. The
RICF counts the number of current government oﬃcials who serve as principals; it
also counts the number of simultaneously retired and senior government oﬃcials who
serve as principals; and (for a hand-coded subset) it counts the number of either
current or retired government oﬃcials who serve as the board president. Note that
the Article 23 law does not forbid retired government oﬃcials from serving as board
principals, and these people may well still represent government inﬂuence (D. D. Li,
1998).
Registration Level. Depending on their scope of operation, foundations may be
registered at the city level, the province level, or the central level. Central-level
registrations enable the foundation to operate on a national scale. Registration level
gives us information on both the scope of foundation operation, and also allow us
to look for preferential interlocking as a function of both scope (e.g., do central-
level foundations preferentially connect to each other) geography (e.g., do same-city
registrations connect preferentially versus diﬀerent-city).
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Table 3.4: Government presence on foundation boards is widespread but variable.
Despite explicit laws against the practice, foundations often have government oﬃcials
as board principals. Hand-coding of a subset of 520 foundation presidents (left panel)
shows that the practice of incorporating current or retired government oﬃcials is
widespread. In both hand-coded data, and self-reports in annual ﬁlings (right panel),
foundations able to raise funds from the general public, and foundations concerned
with government unfavorable activities, are more likely to be controlled in this fashion.
Oﬃcial or Retired-Oﬃcial President Oﬃcial Principal
(Hand-coded subset) (RICF)
Non-Sensitive Sensitive
Public 74%± 3% 79%± 5%
Non-Public 41%± 3% 29%± 9%
Non-Sensitive Sensitive
34%± 1% 54%± 3%
9%± 2% 19%± 4%
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Individual-Level Statistics and the Presence of State Power
Table 3.3 shows the breakdown of the foundations in the RICF data. Collectively,
the 3,344 foundations in our data have a combined income of 35.3 billion RMB;
approximately 5.5 billion USD at current exchange rates. Paralleling Tocqueville’s
accounts of the diverse initiatives of citizens in 19th Century America, foundations in
contemporary China range in activity in everything from the promotion of the board
game we´iq´ı (Go) to legal aid for the indigent. The majority are restricted to non-
public fundraising, and work in non-sensitive areas. These non-public foundations
control just over half of the total yearly nonproﬁt revenue in the country.
Despite laws to the contrary, our results conﬁrm persistent and high levels of
state involvement in the governance of foundations. Table 3.4 shows the relationship
between fundraising scope and activity, relying on both the hand-coded 3A subsample
that tracks the aﬃliations of board presidents, and oﬃcial self-reports in the full
database. Because the 3A hand-coding includes retired oﬃcials, the two methods
track slightly diﬀerent phenomena.
Both methods conﬁrm that the presence of government oﬃcials is less for non-
public foundations. The government is most involved in foundations that are able
to raise funds from the general public. (Self-reports, but not our hand-coding, show
additional supervision when the foundation itself is associated with sensitive activi-
ties. Because this signal does not appear in the hand-coded subset, it may be best-
explained by diﬀering incentives: public foundations involved with sensitive activities
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Table 3.5: The fraction of nodes of each type that share board members with other
foundations. The board interlock network extends to a signiﬁcant fraction of all
Chinese nonproﬁts. Both public and non-public fundraising foundations are highly
integrated into the overall network, with central-level foundations able to raise from
the general public the most connected of all.
Public Non-Public
Central 82%± 1% 72%± 1%
Provincial 47%± 2% 36%± 2%
City 67%± 1% 24%± 1%
may be more willing to report government oﬃcials on their boards, despite the fact
that this violates Article 23.)
3.3.2 Board Interlock: Super-Connectors and Elites
Board interlock is widespread. A signiﬁcant fraction of the foundations are integrated
into the network: of the 3,344 foundations, 1,411 (42%) share board members with
at least one other foundation, for a total of 1,863 links. As shown in Table 3.5,
foundations at the central level are the most likely to be connected. Both public
and private foundations show signiﬁcant network integration. A large fraction of
this network connects together into a single giant component that contains 1,022
foundations (see Fig. 3.2).
While the existence of board interlock parallels the dominant corporate cases
studied in the West, there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences. Most notably, the network is
not small world: the average path length between nodes in the giant component is
7.71, and the network diameter is 27; in both cases much larger than the corporate
board interlock seen in the United States (Davis, Yoo, & Baker, 2003).
The board interlock network in Chinese foundations, in other words, has a ten-
dency to isolate nodes from each other. Even if we restrict to the 77 central-level
foundations in the giant component, the diameter remains large (9 steps); by com-
parison, the network of Fortune 800 ﬁrms in the 1970s, nearly ten times larger, had a
diameter of ﬁve (Levine, 1977). Chinese foundations connect to each other, but the
existence of these long paths shows that board interlocks are fundamentally limited
in their ability to coordinate action on the very largest scales.
While the network has few shortcuts and hubs that connect otherwise distant
nodes, it is also the case that a small number of foundations have very high degree—
they share an unusually large number of board members with other foundations. We
show the network degree distribution in Fig. 3.3. The existence of these “super-
29
Figure 3.2: The giant component of the board interlock network, containing 1022
nodes and 1626 edges; 75% of the nodes with non-zero degree, and 30% of the full
database. A simple spring loaded network layout algorithm allows us to visualize
which nodes are tightly coupled to many others (end up at the center), and which
are connected to the main network by only a small number of links to peripheral
nodes. At the center are a small number of interlinking elite super-connectors with
high degree (Fig. 3.3; Fig. 3.4). Node size is scaled by PageRank; node colors label
the top ten largest clusters found using the Louvain algorithm (see Table 3.9).
connectors” can be empirically conﬁrmed by testing for heavy-tailed degree distri-
butions; standard methods strongly prefer a log-normal distribution to both an ex-
ponential (i.e., random-graph) and power-law ﬁt (Alstott, Bullmore, & Plenz, 2014;
Clauset, Shalizi, & Newman, 2009).
These super-connectors appear to preferentially connect to each other, suggesting
the existence of highly connected elite groups (the “rich-club phenomenon”, ﬁrst
noted by (Zhou & Mondragon, 2004)). Fig. 3.4 shows the rich-club coeﬃcient in the
30
Figure 3.3: The degree distribution of the board interlock network. The distribution
is log-normal (dashed-line ﬁt), and a small fraction of the nodes have unusually high
degree.
full, the public, and the non-public subnetworks. To read this ﬁgure, ﬁrst follow the
solid line; that this line is rising as a function of k shows that, in the full network,
nodes with higher degree are more likely to connect to each other than in a null model
that preserves the node degree distribution but otherwise shuﬄed connections. Now
follow the dashed line, which considers just the internal connections of the non-public
subnetwork. This line shows that this same phenomenon, seen in the full network,
is even stronger here: non-public elites are even more likely to preferentially connect
within this subnetwork. Finally, note the (very short) dotted line. This shows at best
weak evidence for a rich-club eﬀect when restricting to the public network. The line
is much shorter, because the public network, considered in isolation, has few high-
degree nodes: if a public foundation has high-degree in the full network, it is usually
because it connects to non-public foundations.
If we code nodes by the board president’s profession, we ﬁnd that the highest
degree nodes include both the government and the business elite. Of the ten highest-
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Figure 3.4: The rich-club coeﬃcient as a function of k-core. High-degree organizations
(“network elites”) preferentially connect to other network elites, particularly in the
non-public network. This is apparent in how the rich-club coeﬃcient grows as a
function of k-core level for the full network (solid line), the public network (dotted
line), and the non-public network (dashed line); 95% conﬁdence ranges are shown.
Nodes with high degree are far more likely to connect to each other, compared to
a null model that preserves the degree distribution but otherwise breaks interlock
correlations (McAuley et al., 2007). Taken separately, the non-public network shows
a stronger rich club eﬀect than the network as a whole. Meanwhile, the majority
of high-degree links in the public network are due to cross-links with the non-public
foundations; the maximal degree for the public network in isolation is much smaller.
degree foundations, six are associated with businesses, four with government. For ex-
ample, the most connected foundation is the YouChange China Social Entrepreneurs
Foundation, set up to encourage philanthropic giving by wealthy entrepreneurs; the
second is the Forbidden City Cultural Heritage Conservation Foundation, which man-
ages the state-owned historical treasure. The top ten most connected board members
are also a mixture of both government and business elites; three are business elites, six
are current government oﬃcials, including members of the National People’s Congress,
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Table 3.6: The number of links found between nodes of each type, compared to a
degree-preserving null. Foundations in the same region, and at the same registration
level, tend to cross link. Centrally-registered foundations are more than twice as
likely to connect to each other than in the null; province-level foundations connect to
others in the same province at rates seven times higher than the null, and city-level
foundations are the most cross-linked of all, linking to other city-level foundations in
the same place at rates 14 times higher than expected.
Central Province City
Central ×2.1± 0.1 ×0.73± 0.03 ×1.2± 0.2
Province (same) — ×7.05± 0.08 ×4.7± 0.5
Province (diﬀerent) — ×0.42± 0.01 ×0.46± 0.05
City (same) — — ×14.6± 0.9
City (diﬀerent) — — 0
the CPPCC, and the Guangzhou People’s Congress; and one is a retired government
oﬃcial.
Considering the public and non-public networks separately allows us to see how
diﬀerent groups dominate. In the public network, the highest-degree nodes are nearly
all associated with the government: of the top ten highest degree foundations, only
two have a president with a non-governmental background (a television celebrity,
and the head of a hospital). By contrast, six of the ten highest degree nodes in
the non-public network are associated with business elites. The highest degree node,
for example, the YouChange Foundation, is run by the businesswoman Ping Wang,
whose background is in international ﬁnance and law.
Board interlock is inﬂuenced by both geography and registration level; see Ta-
ble 3.6, paralleling classic results for corporate networks, co-located foundations are
far more likely to connect (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2004; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001;
Stuart, 1998). We also ﬁnd evidence for preferential connections between sensitive
foundations; there are 70%±10% more links between sensitive foundations than found
in the null. However, public- and non-public foundations appear to intermix freely
and preferences (though detectable) are weak; public foundations are only 16%± 3%
more likely to link to each other than null, and only 17% ± 3% less likely to link to
non-public foundations.
3.3.3 Network Eﬀects: Penetration of State Power
We next consider how the presence or absence of government oﬃcials predicts node
degree. We use a multiple linear regression model, with node degree as the dependent
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Table 3.7: Predictors of node degree, in public and non-public fundraising networks,
and in the joint network, in a multiple linear regression. Non-public foundations
preferentially exclude current government oﬃcials from the highest degree nodes,
even when controlling for other variables. (z) indicates z-scored transformed real
variables; all other variables are binary for presence/absence.  superscripts label
signiﬁcance:  (p < 0.05);  (p < 0.01);    (p < 0.001).
Public Non-Public Joint
Independent Variable Network Network Network
State Power
Current Oﬃcial 0.17± 0.08 −0.44± 0.13 −0.15± 0.11
Retired, Senior Oﬃcial 0.0± 0.1 0.1± 0.2 0.2± 0.2
Legal Status
Central Level 0.72± 0.15 0.90± 0.16 1.6± 0.2
Evaluation 3A+ 0.33± 0.12 0.55± 0.12 0.66± 0.12
Public — — −0.1± 0.1
Intrinsic
Board Size (z) 0.31± 0.04 0.28± 0.04 0.52± 0.04
Income (z) 0.19± 0.04 0.16± 0.04 0.40± 0.04
Age (z) −0.03± 0.05 0.00± 0.04 −0.06± 0.04
Sensitive Area −0.10± 0.08 0.33± 0.16 0.13± 0.11
R = 0.42 R = 0.34 R = 0.44
variable and nine independent variables: three variables describing the node’s legal
status (public vs. non-public; registration level; evaluation level), four “nuisance”
variables describing the intrinsic properties of the foundation (board size, income,
sensitive area, and age), and two variables operationalizing the state power: (1)
current government oﬃcials, and (2) retired, senior-level government oﬃcials, the
two ﬁelds in the main RICF database. We consider both the full network, and the
two public and non-public networks separately. The results are shown in Table 3.7.
The most surprising results concern the relationship between the presence or ab-
sence of government oﬃcials, and node degree. Foundation degree is (weakly) pos-
itively correlated with government presence in the public foundations: nodes with
higher degree are more likely to have government oﬃcials. However, in the non-
public network, high degree is strongly (and signiﬁcantly, p < 10−3) correlated with
reduced government presence. When the two networks are joined together, the two
eﬀects compete against each other, partially canceling out. Signiﬁcantly, we ﬁnd no
correlation for the presence or absence of retired senior oﬃcials; only the absence
of currently-serving oﬃcials is predicted by node degree. To allow comparisons be-
tween diﬀerent networks, we use z-score transformed data; for example, in Table 3.7,
34
Table 3.8: Predictors of node degree, in public and non-public fundraising networks,
and in the joint network; hand-coded 3A. Use of a diﬀerent, hand-coded dataset
for government presence conﬁrms the results of Table 3.7: non-public foundations
preferentially exclude current government oﬃcials from the highest degree nodes.
The “president oﬃcial” code includes retired oﬃcials.
Public Non-Public Joint
Independent Variable Network Network Network
State Power
President Oﬃcial 0.06± 0.25 −0.68± 0.37 −0.65± 0.34
Legal Status
Central Level 1.06± 0.26 1.0± 0.5 2.6± 0.4
Public — — −0.3± 0.3
Intrinsic
Board Size (z) 0.42± 0.09 0.60± 0.19 0.81± 0.16
Income (z) 0.28± 0.09 0.38± 0.18 0.75± 0.15
Age (z) −0.04± 0.09 0.0± 0.2 0.0± 0.15
Sensitive Area −0.40± 0.20 0.4± 0.6 −0.4± 0.4
R = 0.48 R = 0.32 R = 0.44
the presence of a current oﬃcial as board principal in the non-public network shifts
node degree down by roughly 0.44 standard deviations (controlling for other factors),
where a standard deviation is measured for all the nodes in the non-public degree
distribution.
Because Table 3.7’s results rely on self-reports, it is possible that these eﬀects may
be driven in part due to diﬀerences in self-reporting. We can check for this eﬀect by
using the hand-coded 3A subset; these results are shown in Table 3.8; because the 3A
hand-coding tracks only presidents, and includes both current and retired oﬃcials,
our results here are not strictly comparable to the Table 3.7 case. The smaller size
of this set also means that our signal-to-noise is lower. In this subset, the weaker
correlation in the public data is no longer detectable, but we still see the negative
correlation between network position and state presence.
3.3.4 Network Clusters: Multipolarity
Following Heemskerk and Takes, 2016, we use the Louvain algorithm (Blondel et al.,
2008) to detect clustering among the foundations in the network. The Louvain algo-
rithm groups nodes into clusters that maximize the total modularity, Q; informally,
the modularity for a cluster is deﬁned the fraction of edges within that cluster, minus
the fraction of edges expected under a degree-preserving null model. When the modu-
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larity is close to one, nodes in a cluster are strongly connected to each other, and only
weakly connected to nodes outside. When the modularity is close to zero, by con-
trast, there is little evidence for the existence of clusters of nodes that preferentially
interconnect.
The foundation network shows strong modularity: the average Q for the network
is 0.816, and we ﬁnd a total of 29 clusters. The top ten clusters by membership
include just over 50% of all foundations in the network. They are shown, using diﬀer-
ent colors, in Fig. 3.2. The strong modularity of the network points to the existence
of structurally independent groups, a precondition for multipolarity. However, it is
possible for clusters to exist in the presence of a strong core-periphery structure: a
core hegemonic cluster could be at the center of a set of more peripheral clusters. To
test for this eﬀect, we consider the average degree of nodes within the cluster, as well
as the total PageRank of each cluster; PageRank provides an independent measure of
network centrality, based on a random-walker model, and can be interpreted as a con-
sensus measure of attention (Heaberlin & DeDeo, 2016) or power (Brush, Krakauer,
& Flack, 2013).
The results argue for the multipolarity hypothesis. While the largest cluster has
higher average degree, and larger PageRank than the others in the top ten, the eﬀect
is not strong, and power is shared remarkably evenly among the largest clusters. We
can quantify this using the Gini coeﬃcient, which for the top-ten clusters is 19%,
where zero is perfect equality. Put another way, the distribution of PageRank among
the top ten clusters is more equal than the famously egalitarian income distribution
in Denmark (Gini coeﬃcient 25% (Central Intelligence Agency, 2018)), and far less
than seen in PageRank distributions found in networks among pages in the world-
wide web (Heaberlin & DeDeo, 2016). The existence of multiple clusters with high
degree and high PageRank is consistent with the rich club eﬀect found above: these
highly central clusters preferentially link within themselves.
Finally, for each cluster, we compute the fraction of nodes within the system that
have government oﬃcials on the board. This allows us to test whether or not the
clusters are deﬁned by characteristic levels of government involvement. For the top
ten clusters, we ﬁnd strong evidence for bimodality in levels of government control.
Clusters are much less likely to show “average” levels of government presence on
boards, and tend to either extreme, either strongly excluding government oﬃcials, or
having far more than expected given the base-rate. Cluster-by-cluster in the top ten,
we have four cases where rates of government presence are either anomalously high, or
low, at the p < 10−3 level, and two more at the p < 0.05 level. The largest and most
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Table 3.9: Size (in nodes), average degree, total PageRank, and rates of government
presence on boards, in the ten largest clusters of the foundation network. Network
power, as measured by PageRank, is shared reasonably equally among the clusters.
Six of the ten networks show anomalously high or low levels of government presence
compared to the baseline rate of 17%.
Cluster Size (Nodes) Average Degree PageRank Government Presence
1 91 5.4± 0.6 11% 2.1% (low)
2 68 3.3± 0.4 7.0% 2.9% (low)
3 66 3.9± 0.4 6.5% 11%
4 55 4.3± 0.6 5.7% 15%
5 53 2.7± 0.4 5.2% 30% (high)
6 50 3.1± 0.4 5.1% 16%
7 46 2.6± 0.2 4.2% 24%
8 43 2.9± 0.3 4.0% 28% (high)
9 39 2.7± 0.2 3.7% 28% (high)
10 38 2.6± 0.4 3.5% 34% (high)
central cluster of all has the lowest rates of government presence: 2.1%, eight times
lower than the expected (null) rate of 17%. The existence of these extreme values
in either direction allow us to reject the null hypothesis—that rates of government
presence are independent of cluster membership—at p  10−6 in the standard Fisher
test. A Bayesian model, which explicitly models clusters as draws from one of two
binomials with diﬀerent values for the probability of government control, is strongly
preferred over a single binomial distribution at similar levels. These relationships are
shown in Table 3.9.
Taken together, these results suggest that the foundation network is a fundamen-
tally multipolar structure, where clusters have roughly equal levels of network power
and are subject to distinct levels of government control. These clusters are further de-
ﬁned both by geography (since foundations with provincial or city-level registrations
tend to strongly associate, see Table 3.6) and public/non-public status.
3.3.5 Longitudinal Analysis: the Emergence of Autonomy
How did these network eﬀects evolve over time? Because board membership changes
over time, a full answer to this question would require knowledge of the dates of both
joining and departure for each member. In the absence of this information, we can
conduct an analysis of the evolution of this network using the board compositions
observed in 2015. This amounts to a longitudinal analysis of civil society growth
rather than a direct study of network dynamics since we expect, particularly for
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the older organizations, some changes in board composition due (at the very least)
to retirement. While this is, on short timescales and under the assumption that
most organizations have relatively stable compositions year to year, a potentially
good approximation, such an analysis is better understood as answering the question
“when did the organizations responsible for the current structure join the network”.
Fig. 3.5 shows the three critical metrics over time, under these assumptions: (1)
the size of the public and non-public network over time; (2) the changing levels of
government presence on boards; and (3) the evolution of the node degree–government
presence relationship.
Overlaid on these panels are ﬁve critical dates in the recent history of the nonproﬁt
sector: (1) 4 June 1989, the Tiananmen Square protests, and the emergence of civil
society in China (Q. Ma, 2002b); (2) 15 September 1995, the Fourth World Conference
on Women, associated with the accelerating development of civil society in China
(Q. Ma, 2005); (3) 1 June 2004, the day the Regulations on the Management of
Foundations, including the above-discussed Article 23, took eﬀect; (4) the Sichuan
Earthquake of 12 May 2008, according to Shieh and Deng, 2011, a critical date in the
expansion of the nonproﬁt sector’s horizontal linkages; and (5) the 12th Five-Year
plan for 2011–2015, introduced March 2011, which devoted a full chapter to “social
management innovation” as a key government target. Fig. 3.6 shows the same plots,
but now for the 3A+ hand-coded subset, as discussed above.
Signiﬁcant numbers of non-public foundations appear soon after the Tiananmen
Square protests, though none of the foundations from that year retain 3A+ status
today. The eﬀect of the 2004 Regulations on the growth rate is clear: for at least the
next ﬁve years, it led to literally exponential growth in the number of both public and
non-public foundations. The growth rate in the non-public sector was signiﬁcantly
stronger, so that, by 2011, the non-public sector was larger than the public one.
The eﬀect of these same regulations on the levels of government supervision is
more complex. The 2004 regulations meant that new organizations reported lower
levels of government principals in the non-public network. This is consistent with
new foundations becoming aware of, and responding to, the restrictions of Article 23.
This decline does not appear as strongly in the 3A+ hand-coded subset, however,
which suggests one of two explanations: that new foundations are continuing to
include government oﬃcials, but staying within the letter of the law by including only
retired oﬃcials, or, that new foundations are continuing to include currently-serving
government oﬃcials, but under-reporting their presence in oﬃcial paperwork. The
eﬀects of Article 23 are inconsistent: the decline in reported government presence does
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not occur in the public network; indeed, after 2008, reported government presence
starts to rise.
Most interesting are the eﬀects of network growth on the relationship between node
degree and government presence. In both the full network, and the 3A+ hand coded
subset, we see that organizations responsible for the current negative relationship
between degree and government presence joined only late in the network history.
Today the non-public network acts to systematically exclude government oﬃcials
from high degree nodes. In the full network, the negative relationship becomes strong
enough to detect soon after the Sichuan earthquake. In the 3A hand-coded subset,
the downward trend towards increasingly negative relationships between degree and
government presence becomes detectable only after the 2011 Five Year Plan.
3.4 Discussion
Our quantitative work here conﬁrms the unusual nature of the state-society rela-
tionship in contemporary China, one that appears to give signiﬁcant network powers
to independent, non-governmental agents. There are high levels of network clus-
tering and autonomy, and a strong, inverse relationship between network centrality
and government supervision. The world of Chinese nonproﬁts is not simple one of
command-and-control, where governmental agents dictate by direct presence the ac-
tions of the most important players in the network. The nature and strength of these
ties may allow for the kinds of decentralized decision-making and policy inﬂuence
seen in a recent qualitative study of civil society organizations in the country (Teets,
2017).
At the same time, our analysis shows that these foundations are hardly a free-
wheeling sector beyond the reach of government power. Our most basic results con-
ﬁrm the persistent and high levels of state presence throughout the nonproﬁt world.
The appointment of government oﬃcials to high-level positions on foundation boards
means that the government continues to hold signiﬁcant levels of direct inﬂuence.
In Tocqueville’s account of civil society in the 19th Century United States, citizens
formed voluntary associations independent of the government itself. Whatever they
are doing, the nonproﬁts of 21st century China are far from this 19th Century model,
and far, also, from models of post-Soviet democratization in Eastern Europe (Walzer,
1992). Our quantitative results ﬁt with what is widely seen in case studies and ﬁeld-
work in China itself: state power may not be complete, but it cannot be ignored.
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3.4.1 Incomplete Control
Our results show signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the level of governmental penetration of the
nonproﬁt sector. This is most apparent among the non-public foundations where, at
least oﬃcially, only one in ten foundations have a current government oﬃcial as board
principal. The government’s relationship to its foundations is bimodal, with public
foundations showing the highest levels of government involvement; not surprisingly,
of this more supervised group, the public foundations engaged in politically-sensitive
topics receive the greatest levels of supervision of all.
The unusual nature of these less-supervised, non-public foundations becomes ap-
parent at the network level. A set of network elites are at the center of the non-public
network. These elites not only serve as hubs for large numbers of other foundations,
but preferentially connect to each other. Examination of the proﬁles of the highest
degree nodes shows that, in a parallel to the United States (Moore et al., 2002), the
nodes responsible for these interconnections are, primarily, the business elites.
Detection of this rich club eﬀect provides a new view on the development of
horizontal relationships that can enable communication and cooperation—a process
captured in ﬁeldwork studies of horizontal connections during the 2008 Sichuan Earth-
quake (Shieh & Deng, 2011), and a missing piece for understanding the development
of state that increasingly devolves government functions to non-government agencies
(Saich, 2000).
That business elites play such a central role in the NGO network ﬁts with re-
cent work that shows an increasing importance of non-corporate venues as corporate
networks fragment (Carroll, 2010; de Graaﬀ, 2012; Domhoﬀ, 2009). Our results go
beyond a simple demonstration of elite homophily, however, in showing how elites in
an authoritarian regime manage relationships with government oﬃcials.
In particular, our network analysis reveals an unexpected negative relationship be-
tween node degree and government presence in the non-public network. Not only is
government penetration much lower overall in the non-public foundations, it appears
to have even less penetration to the foundations at the network’s center. Horizontal
relationships between foundations appear to selectively exclude the top-down “verti-
cal” control of the state in a form of structural autonomy.
These horizontal relationships are arranged in such a way to create a multipolar
structure at the heart of the foundation network. Rather than a set of core-periphery
relationships, the network’s high levels of clustering suggest that the world of Chinese
NGOs is fundamentally multipolar (Heemskerk & Takes, 2016). Distinct clusters
appear to share central places in the network, and the largely equal share of network
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power given to each cluster means that there is little evidence of a dominant hegemon
to which all other clusters uniquely attach. What inequality in network power exists
appears, if anything, to be associated with reduced levels of government presence:
the two largest clusters in the network have signiﬁcantly lower levels of government
presence than expected.
3.4.2 Emergence of Elite Autonomy
A dynamical analysis of network formation, shows how recent the creation of this par-
tially autonomous sphere has been. Negative relationships between network power
and government control appeal soon after the 2008 Earthquake (the downward trend
in the 3A subset appears around this time as well, but only becomes statistically
signiﬁcant in 2011). This result lends new support to Shieh and Deng’s (2011) quali-
tative study which associated the earthquake to lasting cultural, political, and social
changes in the nonproﬁt world that led to new forms of autonomous civil society.
Zhang, Rezaee, and Zhu (2010) support these results from a diﬀerent angle, suggest-
ing the increasing importance of private, as opposed to state-controlled, organizations
in nonproﬁt relief. In a comparative of study of how government-controlled and pri-
vate ﬁrms responded to the 2008 Earthquake, they found that private ﬁrms donated
to relief more rapidly, and at greater levels of ﬁnancial assistance, that state-owned
ﬁrms. Even many years after the 2008 Earthquake, these eﬀects persist.
One more recent political change comes from the government: the promotion of
“social management innovation” (chuangxin shehui guanli), a core concept of state
policy ﬁrst introduced in the 4th Plenum of the 16th CCP Congress in 2004 (Pieke,
2012; Schlæger & Jiang, 2014); the 12th Five-Year plan for 2011–2015 elaborated the
policy as a governance target, proposing “party leadership, government responsibility,
societal cooperation, public participation” as key principles (translation), the use of
civil society to provide social services, and a correspondingly less rigid approach to
controlling it (Shan, 2013). Our results conﬁrm the impact of these further reforms:
in the post-plan era, the negative relationship between government presence and node
degree has persisted.
Crucially, our data does not include the so-called “grassroots”, or illegal NGOs
that, while tolerated by the state, operate without legal sanction (Spires, 2011). These
NGOs sometimes include Communist party members on staﬀ, are largely tolerated
by the state and often seen as socially legitimate organizations, and often provide
essential services in cases where the state can not. Despite their technical illegality,
government oﬃcials sometimes even lend explicit support to their mission. This qual-
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itative work further suggests that members of illegal NGOs are largely uninterested
in organizing independently in ways that might appear to threaten the state. Taken
at face value, these suggest that were data on the staﬀ or board members of illegal
NGOs to be incorporated into our networks, we would ﬁnd them in a core-periphery
relationships to the oﬃcially-sanctioned actors we study here.
3.4.3 Civil Society and the Meaning of Network Connectivity
Network connectivity is associated with the ability to form common knowledge (Chwe,
1999), and both simulations and theory suggest that nodes of high degree play a cru-
cial role when common knowledge is required for joint action (Liddell & DeDeo, 2015).
The negative relationship between node degree and government presence observed in
our data then amounts to a form of structural autonomy. Taken at face value, these
results seem to suggest that foundations within this non-public subset may be part
of the emergence of a new civil society, whose interlocks occur increasingly indepen-
dently of the state, and whose resultant capacity for independent coordination might
even be seen as a threat to authoritarian control.
The identiﬁcation of these links with a Tocquevillian civil society is complicated,
however, by the fact that when the most connected of the non-public foundations
are not government in origin, they appear, instead, to be drawn from the business
elite. The extensive ties between the state and business then suggest that this civil
society is something less than might be expected; ever since the reforms of the 1980s,
scholars have suggested that the business elite act as an agent of the government itself
(Pearson, 1997).
Indeed, this provides a clear alternate explanation: if the highest degree nodes
are suﬃciently aligned with the government to begin with, they can be allowed to
operate without direct supervision—precisely as we see in our data. Whether or not
the elite are truly independent of the government, their special position in society,
and their ability to inﬂuence the government ﬁnancially (D. Ma & Parish, 2006)
suggests that this civil society, such as it is, is far from the pluralist Tocquevillian
world of the ordinary citizen. Understood in this context, and with the caveat that
our work here is able to cover only the oﬃcial NGOs, and not the illegal sector, these
results are perhaps more consistent with the theory of “consultative authoritarianism”
(Teets, 2013), in which the government tolerates increasing levels of autonomy among
non-governmental organizations while developing new strategies of indirect control.
Networks of state power may overlap with ones deﬁned by economic exchange, but
need not be coextensive (Mann, 1986).
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Our results show that the government has come to tolerate communities of in-
terlocking associations that operate with lower levels of direct government presence.
Today, the total number of these organizations is small. The new Charity Law, eﬀec-
tive from 1 September 2016, allows a far greater number of associations—potentially
in the hundreds of thousands—to raise funds from the general public. We expect
the rapid expansion in both the size and scale of the Chinese nonproﬁt sector will
radically increase its impact on the state-society relationship.
3.4.4 Networked Civil Society and Multipolar Structure
Finally, our cluster analysis suggests that the social actors in civil society are organized
into larger clusters by horizontal relationships, and arranged in such a way to creature
a relatively equal relationship between the most important clusters in the network:
a multipolar world (Heemskerk & Takes, 2016) of Chinese NGOs. Distinct clusters
appear to share central places in the network, and the equal shares of network power
given to each cluster is very diﬀerent from a system with a dominant hegemon to
which all other clusters uniquely attach.
The clusters are not perfectly equal in network power. The inequality in network
power that does exist appears to be associated with reduced levels of government
presence: the two largest clusters in the network have signiﬁcantly lower levels of
government presence than expected. This result, concerning the most powerful clus-
ters of individual nodes, parallels the results on elite autonomy among the nodes with
greatest network power on the individual level.
By allowing these more egalitarian, more horizontal structures to emerge—and,
further, by allowing the most important of these structures to operate with increased
independence from central monitoring—the state may have made it possible for orga-
nizations to make more eﬃcient use of local and distributed knowledge (von Hayek,
1945). The patterns in which these new structures arrange themselves call to mind
classic theories of decentralized decision-making in liberal societies that draw at-
tention to autonomous, spontaneous, and “polycentric” orders (Polanyi, 1951; von
Hayek, 2011). At the same time, persistently high levels of state involvement in the
sector frustrate a simple analogy to descriptions of liberal states. Our account of
Chinese civil society here, in terms of the simultaneous presence of both horizontal
(group-to-group), and vertical (group-to-state) linkages, and the structural tensions
between the two, ﬁnds parallels in recent work on collective action in rural China
(Yao Lu & Tao, 2017), which identiﬁes a new class of “semi-integrated” organizations
that can mobilize both horizontal and vertical linkages at once.
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Remarkably, the Chinese government does not appear to be combating the emer-
gence of a potential civil society counter-power either through direct monitoring, or
through disruption of network ties. There is plenty of evidence that individual foun-
dations in the oﬃcial Chinese nonproﬁt sector today are relatively tame, with a strong
tendency to align their goals with that of the state (Teets, 2013). Yet the underlying
network structures that these organizations have implicitly created have the potential
to enable more independent action and decision-making than one would expect; they
are certainly very far away from the highly centralized social structure and planned
economy that characterized mainland China during Mao’s rule. Our work suggests
that the government will either increasingly employ less-visible strategies of control,
or, conversely, come to accept the delivery of social and economic needs through a
rapidly-growing, complex, and increasingly autonomous sphere.
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Chapter 4 Funding nonproﬁts in a networked society: Two modes of
crowding mechanism of government support
This chapter studies the impact of social relations on organizational and individual
economic behavior in the crowding process of government funding–the eﬀect that
government funding to nonproﬁts may crowd out or crowd in private donations. By
using a novel panel dataset across 12 years, this study tests two modes of crowding
mechanism considering the impact of social relations: compensating mode and am-
plifying mode. Analysis suggests that, although government funding to a nonproﬁt
may crowd out the private donations to the same organization, private donations are
not reduced but redistributed to other nonproﬁts in the organizational network. Our
ﬁndings support the compensating mode and the importance of social relations in
resource distribution. Policy and practical implications are discussed.
4.1 Introduction
Government funding to nonproﬁts intends to increase the provision of under-provided
public goods or services. However, theoretical studies ﬁnd that the government fund-
ing may crowd out private donation: for every dollar increase in government funding,
the private donations may decrease by one entire dollar or less (e.g., Abrams and
Schmitz, 1978; Andreoni, 1989, 1990; Roberts, 1984; Warr, 1982). A common theo-
retical hypothesis for these studies is that the donors may see contributions to public
goods through taxation as substitutes to the private donations to nonproﬁt organi-
zations. The crowd-out eﬀect of government funding is one of the most important
inquiries in public economics because it is critical to the government and policy mak-
ers in providing optimal goods and services: government spending is useless if the
crowding out eﬀect on private donations is by one entire dollar.
A considerable number of empirical studies made the eﬀorts to understand the
crowd-out eﬀect since the 1980s, but the academic community still has no consensus
on the size and direction of crowding out. Scholars usually use four types of research
methods on this topic: laboratory experiments, survey experiments, archival data
from tax return forms, and micro-level survey data (de Wit & Bekkers, 2017, p. 302).
The research methods have strong eﬀect on the results, for example, laboratory ex-
periments consistently found large crowd-out eﬀects with an average of 64% decrease
of private donation14, while the average eﬀect found through non-experimental meth-
14A very recent and innovative research used social media to run experiments within a naturalistic
context, and found no evidence supporting either crowd-out or crowd-in eﬀect (Jilke, Lu, Xu, &
Shinohara, 2018).
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ods is a 6% increase (de Wit & Bekkers, 2017, p. 309). In general, two-thirds of
previous estimates support the crowd-out hypotheses, while one-third are against the
hypothesis and support the crowd-in eﬀect (de Wit & Bekkers, 2017, p. 311).
Two types of methodological problems reside in previous empirical studies (Ribar
& Wilhelm, 2002, 437–438). First is the mismatch between private donations and
government support using data extracted from tax returns or general surveys, and
this issue was solved by using data compiled on an organization-by-organization ba-
sis in later studies. The second problem results from omitted variables, that is, the
government funding and private donations may be jointly determined by some un-
observed variables (Payne, 2009, pp. 163–164; Steinberg, 1985, p. 62). For example,
people who are more altruistic are likely to both give more and vote for higher levels
of government provision and support.
The issue of omitted variables still is one of the most challenging problem when
estimating crowd-out eﬀect. The use of panel data and ﬁxed eﬀect analysis is one
solution. For example, the time or organization ﬁxed eﬀect analysis can address the
problem of omitted variables that are time or individual invariant. Even though,
this approach cannot exhaust all omitted variables, for instance, the changing pref-
erence of government oﬃcials can be captured by neither time nor organization ﬁxed
eﬀect. Another practice is using instrumental variables (or instruments for short)
in two-stage least square (2SLS) analysis. Good instruments must strongly predict
government funding and do not directly predict private donations. In the ﬁrst-stage
estimation, government funding is predicted by the instruments, and then in the
second-stage analysis, the ﬁtted values of government funding are used to evaluate
the crowding out eﬀect on private donations. The quality of instruments can be eval-
uated by statistical tests, but a convincing argument explaining why the instruments
are good is critical (Payne, 2009, p. 165). However, instruments used in existing
studies can hardly be convincing (Ribar & Wilhelm, 2002, p. 438).
Other than the methodological problems, the theoretical setting is also limited:
many of previous studies are inherently ﬂawed for not considering “the problem of
embeddedness.” Economic behaviors are often understood from an “under-socialized”
or atomized perspective, that is, actors are atoms outside a social context and driven
by self-interest. But the social structures in which the actors are embedded also
constrain the economic behaviors — the “problem of embeddedness”: Economic be-
haviors are “embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations” (Granovetter,
1985). But existing studies on crowding out/in only consider the government funding
and private donations directly made to the same nonproﬁt i (Figure4.7). A recent
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Figure 4.7: Existing studies not considering social relations.
paper on crowd-out examined the social relations in donors’ networks using numerical
experiments (Chih, 2016). This paper found that the crowd-out eﬀect of government
funding is less intense on donors who are more embedded in the social networks be-
cause the social norms that encourage private donations are stronger for these people
(Chih, 2016, p. 84). Unfortunately, no empirical study using real-world data has
been conducted to examine the impact of social relations on the crowding eﬀect.
By tracing the activities of more than four thousand charitable Chinese founda-
tions over twelve years, we compiled a novel and high quality panel dataset with over
17 thousand observations. Although unbalanced overall, the dataset has 3,147 foun-
dations with at least 3 observations. This study contributes to the literature from
three aspects. First, the social relations between organizations may result in “cross-
crowding” eﬀect, that is, private donations to organization i may be inﬂuenced by
the government funding to i’s neighbor organizations a and b (Figure 4.8). Second,
the impact of network embeddedness on private donation is examined, that is, foun-
dation’s network position may also inﬂuence private donation. Third, we study one
of the largest countries in the world, People’s Republic of China (“China” hereafter),
which has never been examined on this topic before. Almost all the existing studies on
this topic use data from Western countries (de Wit & Bekkers, 2017, p. 303), but we
know nothing about China. Given the speciﬁc state–society relationship and popular-
ity of government–nonproﬁt social service contracting (J. Ma & DeDeo, 2018; Zhao,
Wu, & Tao, 2016), this study extends our knowledge on this topic to authoritarian
countries and generate important implications for policy. The ﬁrst and second contri-
bution introduce a new network perspective for understanding the crowding process,
rendering private donation as an imperfect substitute to government funding.
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Figure 4.8: Studies considering social relations.
4.2 Research Questions and Operationalization
4.2.1 Why Social Relation Matters: Board Interlock and Institutional Isomorphism
Board interlock refers to the practice of sharing board members between organiza-
tions. In a board interlocking network, nodes represent organizations, and two nodes
are connected if they share one or more board members. The values, information,
and decisions can be diﬀused among the boards through the shared board members.
Because of board’s important role in governance, the board interlocking network has
long been a research interest of scholars from diﬀerent academic disciplines. Although
critics remain, studying such network is a valid approach to understanding the or-
ganizational behavior embedded in social relations. See Davis (1996) and Mizruchi
(1996) for reviews and critiques to board interlocking studies.
According to new institutionalism, the organizations connected by board inter-
locking relationships can be isomorphic in numerous ways because these relation-
ships provide perfect channels for the three isomorphic processes to happen: coercive,
mimetic, and normative (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 150). Coercive isomorphism
is a result of both formal and informal pressures, for example, foundations are ex-
pected by society to lower their administrative cost and required by law to disclose
their ﬁnancial reports in a standardized format. The board as governance body has
the right to enforce these requirements, and board interlocked organizations are more
likely to enforce the same requirements. Mimetic process results from the responses
to environmental uncertainty, for example, new foundations may mimic the operation
of well-established forerunners in the same ﬁeld, or even invite their board members,
to reduce the risk of uncertainty and secure more resources. Normative pressures are
because of professionalization, for example, board interlocked organizations are more
likely to share standards of services and operations.
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Empirical study has suggested that the boards of nonproﬁts have critical roles in
sharing information and coordinating organizational strategies within the organiza-
tions, they can also shape external donors’ perceptions of the organizations (Faulk
et al., 2015). Because the boards can be isomorphic through board interlocking rela-
tionships, these isomorphic boards may be able to inﬂuence nonproﬁts’ revenues and
donors’ decisions of giving. For example, for individual donors, organization a can be
a good alternative to its isomorphic organization i if they are board-interlocked, and
the isomorphic boards can redirect donors’ giving from i to a if the board members
perceive the former has received abundant government funding. Such theoretical as-
sumption which we know nothing about leads to our research hypothesis: the two
modes of crowding mechanism.
4.2.2 Considering Social Relation: Two Modes of the Crowding Mechanism
Considering social relations between organizations, we can hypothesize two modes of
crowding mechanism: the amplifying mode and compensating mode (Figure 4.9). If
the direct and cross crowding eﬀects are in the same direction, then the crowding eﬀect
is ampliﬁed and therefore named as “amplifying mode.” For example, government
funding has a direct-crowd-out eﬀect on nonproﬁt i and cross-crowd-out eﬀect on
isomorphic nonproﬁt a and b. By a similar rationale, if the direct- and cross-crowding
eﬀects are in diﬀerent directions, these mechanisms are labeled as “compensating
mode.”
According to the two theoretical modes of crowding mechanism and interest in
network embeddedness, we propose two research questions: 1) What are the direct-
and cross-crowding eﬀects of government funding on private donations? 2) Does net-
work embeddedness have impact on private donations? The basic setup for answering
the two questions is the following equation:
Donationsi =α + β ·GovFundi + γ ·NbrGovSumi + δ ·NetEmbedi+
ω · Controlsi + μ · Controlsr + εi
(4.1)
Private donation to organization i (Donationsi) is regressed on the amount of
government funding to i (GovFundi), the weighted sum of government funding to i’s
neighbor foundations (NbrGovSumi; deﬁned by Eq. 4.2), a set of variables measuring
i’s network embeddedness (NetEmbedi), and a set of control variables at organiza-
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tional level (Controlsi) and regional level (Controlsr)
15. The coeﬃcient β, γ, and δ
measure the direct-crowding eﬀect, cross-crowding eﬀect, and network position eﬀect,
respectively.
NbrGovSumi =
∑
j∈d(i)
(GovFundj · Isomoij) (4.2)
In Eq. 4.2, d(i) is a set of neighbor organizations that are directly connected
to i through board interlocking relationship. By summing the weighted values of
government funding to j where j ∈ d(i), we have the total amount of government
funding to i’s neighbor organizations. We only consider the ﬁrst-degree neighbors
in this study. Although the inﬂuence of indirect connection is possible, we expect
the eﬀect is small and save this for future study. The correlation between direct
government funding and neighbor government funding is weak (r = 0.24), suggesting
the two variables are not collinear.
The weight Isomoij measures the similarity of board between organization i and j,
and is calculated by Eq. 4.3 in which BoardShareij is the number of board members
shared by i and j, and PooledIndij represents the number of pooled individuals from
the boards of the two organizations i and j:
Isomoij =
BoardShareij
UniqIndij
(4.3)
The sum of neighbor government funding is weighted because of the “isomorphous-
ness” between organizations. Board interlocking relationships can vary in diﬀusing
information and coordinating. For example, organization i and j are more capable
of sharing information and being isomorphic because their boards are largely over-
lapped, while i and k are less capable of doing so because they only share few board
members.
4.2.3 Network Construction and Variables Measuring Network Embeddedness
A network consists of nodes (vertices) and edges (ties), and social network analysis is
the practice of analyzing the social structure through networks (graphs). In a network,
the nodes can be any entities of interests, for example, organizations, individuals,
events, countries, or even abstract political concepts. The edges (ties) represent the
relationships (e.g., friendship or aﬃliation) between the nodes.
15The “regions” in this study includes the following administrative divisions of China: 22
provinces, 5 autonomous regions, and 4 municipalities. See http://bit.ly/2OByozb for a list of
these regions.
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Scholars have developed various metrics to measure the importance of nodes in
terms of strategic positions (Freeman, 1977, 1978; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Among
these metrics, concepts and measures of centrality have been used extensively (Abbasi,
Hossain, & Leydesdorﬀ, 2012, p. 406). In general, there are four types of centrality
describing the importance or embededness of nodes in a network (Faust, 1997, p.
160).
1. Degree centrality measures a given node’s direct connection with other nodes,
actors are central if they are directly connected with many other nodes.
2. Betweenness centrality measures how often a given node falls along the short-
est path between two other nodes, nodes with high betweenness centrality are
central because they are capable of mediating information or resource ﬂows
between other actors.
3. Closeness centrality measures the sum of geodesic distances from a given node
to all the other nodes in the network, actors are central if they can reach many
other nodes through eﬃcient (i.e., short) paths.
4. Eigenvector centrality calculate the centrality for a node based on the centrality
of its neighbors: actors are central if they are connected to other nodes that
are themselves important. Based on diﬀerent algorithms, eigenvector central-
ity has numerous variants, for example, the Katz centrality (Bonacich, 1987;
Katz, 1953) was used in an study assessing the impact of donor’s social net-
work on crowd-out eﬀect (Chih, 2016). Eigenvector centrality shows advantages
compared to other centrality measures (Bonacich, 2007), especially in analyz-
ing exchange networks (Borgatti & Everett, 2006; Cook, Emerson, Gillmore, &
Yamagishi, 1983).
Among the four measures, degree centrality is most fundamental and we can ex-
pect it may be collinear with the other network variables. But for the other three
measures, although they all measure the importance of position in a network, these
metrics are diﬀerent by nature because they use diﬀerent assumptions and theories
to deﬁne “importance.” Correlation analysis supports this hypothesis: Degree cen-
trality strongly correlates with betweenness and closeness centrality (r > 0.7) and
moderately correlates with Katz centrality (r > 0.5). Therefore, we exclude degree
centrality and use betweenness, closeness, and Katz centrality in regression analysis
(Table 4.10).
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Table 4.10: Correlation matrix of network centrality values. Degree centrality is
excluded in regression models because it strongly correlates with betweenness and
closeness centrality (r > 0.7) and moderately correlates with Katz centrality (r > 0.5).
DG N D B C K
Direct government funding 1.0
Neighbor government funding 0.24 1.0
Degree centrality 0.053 0.090 1.0
Betweenness centrality 0.031 0.070 0.79 1.0
Closeness centrality 0.029 0.063 0.55 0.45 1.0
Katz centrality 0.0064 0.016 0.53 0.49 0.32 1.0
4.2.4 Control Variables at Organizational Level
Control variables at the organizational level include: variables measuring government
connections (government or non-government aﬃliated and number of government
oﬃcials on board), foundation’s working area, fundraising type, and a set of variables
measuring organizational capacity (age, asset size, and board size)16. A detailed list
of these variables is in http://bit.ly/2OByozb.
Variables measuring government connections. In the studies on Chinese nonprof-
its and civil society, one of the most important research interests is the nonproﬁts’
relationship with government and politics (Chamberlain, 1993; Estes, 1998; Kang
& Han, 2008; J. Ma & DeDeo, 2018; Q. Ma, 2002a, 2002b; Spires, 2011; Teets,
2017; Unger & Chan, 1995, e.g., ). Chinese nonproﬁts are divided into two cat-
egories: non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and government-aﬃliated NGOs
(GONGOs). NGOs are funded and operated by civic power, for example, the social
elites and ordinary citizens. On the contrary, the GONGOs are initiated, funded, and
well-connected with the state.
The government organizes the GONGOs for transforming part of its functions,
especially the social welfare functions (detailed history was reviewed in Q. Ma, 2002a).
For example, the China Youth Development Foundation (CYDF) was established
by the Chinese Communist Youth League Central Committee (CCYLCC) in March
1993 (China Youth Development Foundation, 2017a). Former principals of CCYLCC
include Li Keqiang, the current Premier of China, and Hu Jintao, the former General
Secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee and the President of China.
CYDF is committed to “helping young people build capacity and to improving the
16The number of full-time employees may also measure the organizational capacity, but many
Chinese foundations have “zero” full-time employees because they have their employees sponsored by
external companies or supervising government departments to minimize foundations’ administrative
expenditure; therefore, a pool indicator of organizational capacity in Chinese context.
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environment for their growth by providing aid services, giving a voice to the interests
of young people and by carrying out social advocacy” (China Youth Development
Foundation, 2017b). The government also transforms the functions that are politically
sensitive to GONGOs: social issues on human rights, policy advocacy, and social
stability (J. Ma & DeDeo, 2018, p. 4). For example, the China Foundation For
Human Rights Development is directed by the State Council Information Oﬃce, and
its president of the board is Huang Mengfu, a vice chairman of the Chinese People’s
Political Consultative Conference and a national leader of China (China Foundation
For Human Rights Development, 2017).
The GONGOs are more likely to receive government funding because of their close
connections with the government. In this study, a foundation is identiﬁed as GONGO
if it meets one of the following criteria (Ni & Zhan, 2017, p. 735; Q. Wang, 2018):
1. Founding organization is governmental or quasi-governmental;
2. Initial endowment is from a governmental agency;
3. Current or retired government oﬃcials as employees or board members; Share
the same oﬃce address with supervising or sponsoring governmental or quasi-
governmental organizations.
Other than the dummy variable measuring being GONGO or not, variables count-
ing the number of government oﬃcials on board are also used as controls including
“number of government oﬃcials serving as principals” and “number of retired gov-
ernment oﬃcials who are provincial or above.”
Foundation’s working area is deﬁned as politically sensitive and politically non-
sensitive. J. Ma and DeDeo (2018) show that foundations working on politically
sensitive topics (i.e., engaging in advocacy, international aﬀairs, religious or ethnic
issues, and the police or the legal system, or related “social stability” issues) have
more government oﬃcials on board, and people may be less likely to donate to these
foundations.
Fundraising type is dummy-coded as public fundraising and non-public fundrais-
ing. The public-fundraising foundations can solicit donations publicly, e.g., adver-
tising in shopping malls or subways; while non-public fundraising foundations are
only allowed to solicit through private channels and target speciﬁed individuals. The
diﬀerence in fundraising capacity may inﬂuence private donations. Meanwhile, the
public-fundraising foundations are more likely to be well-connected with the govern-
ment than non-public fundraising foundations. Therefore, the status of being pubic
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or non-public may confound the relationship between government funding and private
donation.
A set of variables measuring organizational capacity includes age, asset size, and
board size. According to organizational ecology theory, new and/or small organiza-
tions are more likely to be inﬂuenced by the external environment, these phenomena
are termed the “liability of newness” and “liability of smallness” respectively (Baum
& Shipilov, 2006, pp. 62–63). This perspective sets the rationale for controlling age
and asset size. Organizations with larger boards of trustees may be stronger in or-
ganizational capacity and have more social connections with donors. These control
variables were also used in numerous previous studies (e.g., Ni, Chen, Ding, & Wu,
2016; Ni & Zhan, 2017; Nie, Liu, & Cheng, 2016; Wei, 2017).
4.2.5 Control Variables at the Regional Level
The control of social and economic characteristics of geographical regions include:
individuals’ actual experience of volunteering and willingness to volunteer, per capita
gross regional product, population at year-end, per capita disposable income of house-
holds, and government spending on social security and employment 17. (Andreoni &
Payne, 2003, 2011; Payne, 1998, 2009).
4.3 Estimation Strategy
4.3.1 Omitted Variables and Endogeneity Bias
The omitted variables (OVs) that change both the dependent and endogenous vari-
ables will cause the endogeneity problem, resulting in biased estimations of β, γ, and
δ in the basic setup (Eq. 4.1). In this study, there are three types of possible OVs
that may bias the estimation:
1. Organization-speciﬁc OVs: These OVs, which cause variation in both govern-
ment funding and private donations, measure the characteristics of the founda-
tions.
2. Time-speciﬁc OVs: These OVs are related with time, for example, a natural
disaster that can increase both government funding and private donations to
foundations.
17This category includes 17 subcategories consisting of public social welfare spending, basic liv-
ing stipend, and natural disaster relief, etc. See PRC Ministry of Finance (2006) for a detailed
explanation.
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3. Region-speciﬁc OVs: The OVs that measure the characteristics of a geographical
region. For example, a province may have a special policy that encourages both
government funding and private donations.
4.3.2 Regression Models
Since the dataset in this study consists of nonproﬁts’ annual data, and these organiza-
tions rarely change their locations, we expect the organization ﬁxed-eﬀect regression
model should be able to control for many of the time- and region-speciﬁc OVs. There-
fore, we use two regression models to estimate the coeﬃcients:
Pooled ordinary least square (pols) uses Eq. 4.1 to estimate the coeﬃcients of
independent variables. This estimation serves as the baseline model and does not
consider the OVs and panel structure.
Organization ﬁxed-eﬀect regression (ofe) considers the organization-speciﬁc OVs
and adds an entity ﬁxed eﬀect (αi) to the baseline equation (Eq. 4.4).
Donationsi = αi + β ·GovFundi + γ ·NbrGovSumi + δ ·NetEmbedi+
ω · Controlsi + μ · Controlsr + εi
(4.4)
4.4 Dataset
4.4.1 Dataset Compiling
Figure 4.10 illustrates the workﬂow of dataset compiling. The master panel dataset
includes two components of data: foundation data (e.g., government funding, total
asset, and organization age, etc.) and social and economic statistics (e.g., the per-
centage of population volunteered in the last year, per capita gross regional product,
and population at year-end, etc.). The data on foundations are mainly drawn from
four sources ranked by credibility:
1. China Social Organizations (CSO)18. This is the oﬃcial website disclosing an-
nual reports and other information of social organizations registered in mainland
China (i.e., foundation jijinhui, membership-based association shehui tuanti,
and social service organizations shehui fuwu jigou). The website is held by the
Ministry of Civil Aﬀairs of China. The annual reports released by CSO contain
the most comprehensive information about foundation, including basic infor-
18http://www.chinanpo.gov.cn
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mation, board member information, ﬁnancial position, ﬁnancial activities, and
cashﬂow, etc.
2. Local government websites. CSO misses some of the foundations’ annual re-
ports, for example, it does not have the annual reports of foundations regis-
tered in Shanghai because Shanghai has its own information disclosing plat-
form19. Data were crawled from these local government websites to supplement
the CSO’s data.
3. China Foundation Center (CFC)20. CFC releases limited information of founda-
tions registered in mainland China. Data released by CFC includes basic proﬁle
(e.g., foundation name, founding date, and board member information), pro-
gram information (e.g., program name and description), and ﬁnancial overview
(e.g., net asset, total annual income, and total government funding).
4. Other credible news websites. For example, Xinhua News Agency21 (the oﬃcial
press agency of China), People’s Daily22 (an oﬃcial newspaper of the Chinese
Communist Party), and Baidu Encyclopedia23 (the largest Chinese-language,
collaborative, web-based encyclopedia).
When data from diﬀerent sources have discrepancies, those from sources with
higher credibility are used. Detailed methodologies and codebook are described in
the Research Infrastructure of Chinese Foundations (J. Ma et al., 2017b); RICF).
The data on social and economic status are pulled from China Statistical Yearbook
(CSY) (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2017), Finance Yearbook of China
(FYC) (China Financial Magazine, 2017), and the Chinese General Social Survey
(CGSS) (Bian & Li, 2012). Link http://bit.ly/2OByozb details all the variables,
roles in equations, and data sources.
4.4.2 Dataset and Variable Description
Table 4.11 describes the number of foundations by year and in comparison to those
numbers recorded by China Statistical Yearbook (National Bureau of Statistics of
19http://xxgk.shstj.gov.cn
20http://foundationcenter.org.cn
21http://www.xinhuanet.com
22http://www.people.com.cn
23http://baike.baidu.com
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Table 4.11: Dataset size compared to the numbers of foundations recorded by Year-
book and RICF. Yearbook = 2017 China Statistical Yearbook (National Bureau of
Statistics of China, 2017); RICF = Research Infrastructure of Chinese Foundations
(J. Ma et al., 2017b). The percentage shows the dataset’s size in proportion of
the average number of foundations recorded by Yearbook and RICF (e.g., for 2005,
12.51% = 113
975+832
· 100%).
Year Yearbook RICF Dataset proﬁle Dataset board
2005 975 832 113 (12.51%) –
2006 1,144 982 192 (18.06%) –
2007 1,340 1,188 194 (15.35%) –
2008 1,597 1,416 490 (32.53%) –
2009 1,843 1,665 695 (39.62%) –
2010 2,200 2,040 1,923 (90.71%) 591 (27.88%)
2011 2,614 2,430 2,130 (84.46%) 2,287 (90.68%)
2012 3,029 2,880 2,508 (84.89%) 2,540 (85.97%)
2013 3,549 3,344 3,100 (89.95%) 3,156 (91.57%)
2014 4,117 4,233 3,478 (83.31%) 3,577 (85.68%)
2015 4,784 4,895 3,320 (68.60%) 3,454 (71.37%)
2016 5,559 – 1,466 (26.37%) 1,343 (24.16%)
Table 4.12: Composition of the panel dataset.
Foundation type
#of foun-
dation
%of foundation
with 3+ observa-
tions
#of ob-
servations
studied
%of total obser-
vations for foun-
dations with 3+
observations
Fundraising type
Public 1,407 93.0% 8,212 98.1%
Non-public 2,458 78.0% 10,862 91.7%
Total 3,865 83.5% 19,074 94.5%
Working area
Sensitive 1,202 77.1% 5,728 92.5%
Non-sensitive 2,977 76.4% 13,663 91.9%
Total 4,179 76.6% 19,391 92.1%
All foundation 4,238 76.2% 19,609 92.0%
China, 2017) and RICF. Table 4.12 describes the composition of the dataset. Al-
though unbalanced overall, the dataset has 3,147 foundations with at least 3 obser-
vations, and these foundations generate a total of 15,519 observations, rendering a
dataset with very high quality.
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4.4.3 Missing Data and Approximation Strategy
The missing ﬁnancial statistics and board member information are critical to our
analysis. For ﬁnancial statistics, there are missing observations and missing ﬁelds.
Because the inactive foundations may not disclose their annual reports regularly, this
results in missing observations that can hardly be imputed. For missing ﬁelds, some
of the observations omit values of variables that can be inferred from other data about
the organization. For example, the amount of total donation is the sum of donations
made by individuals and those made by corporations. Therefore, the missing values
of individual donation can be imputed by subtracting corporate donation from to-
tal donation (detailed procedures in http://bit.ly/2OByozb) Otherwise, we made no
imputation for the missing variable and omitted the observation. Because of missing
observations, the dataset may only be a representative sample of active but not all
foundations. The data ﬁelds that are missing at random can reduce statistical power
but our estimates are unbiased. The analysis and conclusion should consider these
limitations.
The board member information is the only source for constructing board inter-
locking networks, but it was too rarely reported during the years 2005-2010 and 2016
to construct reliable networks (see Table 4.11 “Dataset board” column). Rather than
omitting these years, we constructed approximate networks using board membership
in the nearest reliable year. That is, using the 2011 network for 2005 to 2010 and
2015 network for 2016. The quality of this approximation depends on the rate of
board turnover, which is generally low in the nonproﬁt sector (J. Ma & DeDeo, 2018,
p. 293).
We use a Chow test (Chow, 1960) to statistically test whether data from the years
using approximated network can be combined with data from other years. Because
the records from 2011–2015 are more reliable, subset 2011–2015 (core) is used as
baseline in comparisons with subsets 2005–2010 (ss10 ) and 2016 (ss16 ). For core
and ss10, F (22, 6836) = 1.31, p = 0.15, the null hypothesis that there is no structural
break between datasets can not be rejected, supporting the two datasets are poolable.
But core and ss16 can not be pooled together because the null hypothesis is rejected
(F (22, 5542) = 4.07, p < 0.001). We therefore prepared the following datasets:
• Pooled dataset (pooled) combines data ss10 and core, that is, using the 2011
board interlocking network for 2005-2010.
• Core dataset (core) is compiled using records from 2011-2015 and data from
these years have the best quality (Table 4.11).
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• Subset 3+ (3plus) consists of records generated from the organizations that have
at least 3 observations in the core dataset.
There are both pros and cons for using diﬀerent datasets. The pooled dataset is
aggressive and may result in a higher risk of Type I error (“false positive” ﬁnding).
While the 3plus subset is conservative and may increase the risk of Type II error
(“false negative” ﬁnding). The core subset is in between.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Descriptive Analysis
Descriptive Statistics of Major Variables
Table 4.13 reports the summary statistics of major variables. Most of these variables
are highly skewed, for example, more than 75% of the foundations do not receive any
funding from the government, but the largest amount of government funding ever
received is nearly 1.4 billion CNY. The median value of private donations made by
individuals is 2,503 CNY, but the largest value is almost 1.1 billion. The median board
size is 10 people, but the largest board has 49 members. Government oﬃcial’s presence
is widespread on board: there is 0.5 government oﬃcial on each foundation’s board
on average, and the foundation that has the most extensive government connection
has 41 oﬃcials on board.
Board Interlocking Network and Top Receivers
Figure 4.11 illustrates the board interlocking network of Chinese foundations by di-
rect government funding and private donation in 201324. In both graphs, isolated
nodes and dyads are removed. Node size represents node degree (i.e., the number of
connected nodes), and node color represents the z-score transformed values of direct
government funding or private donation (the larger the deeper). According to the vi-
sualizations, well-connected organizations are more likely to receive larger amounts of
private donation, but the relationship between connectedness and direct government
funding is not obvious. The average degree of the network is 3.18, the average path
length is 6.73, and the network diameter is 22. Compared to what has been found
about the corporate network in the United States, the board interlocking network of
Chinese foundations is much sparser (Davis et al., 2003).
24We choose the 2013 network because board member information of this year is the most com-
prehensive (Table 4.11).
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Table 4.14 describes the top receivers of government funding and private donation.
Between 2005–2016, 50 foundations are ranked as the top-10 government funding
receivers (tgf), 46 top-10 neighbor government funding receivers (tngf), and 67 top-
10 private donation receivers (tpd). Top receivers of tgf are funded by the government
with 56 million CNY a year on average. Neighbor organizations of tngf receives 310
million CNY from the government per year on average. And the tpd foundations
receive 84 million CNY from private individuals on average annually.
Interesting pattern emerges for board size: diﬀerent types of top receivers are
very close in board size – they all have a board with about 17 members, which is
higher than the overall average 12. Over 80% of all these top receivers are GONGO,
and the average number of government oﬃcials on board of these foundations are
substantially higher than the overall average (0.5 person per organization).
Foundations appear in all rankings are: 1) Chou Pei-yuan Foundation focusing on
international relations, education, and technologies, supervised by the United Front
Work Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China; 2)
China Education Development Foundation supervised by the Ministry of Education;
3) China Postdoctoral Science Foundation supervised by the Ministry of Human Re-
sources and Social Security; 4) China Women’s Development Foundation supervised
by the All-China Women’s Federation; 5) China Legal Aid Foundation supervised by
the Ministry of Justice; and 6) Chinese Red Cross Foundation supervised by the Red
Cross Society of China.
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Table 4.14: Proﬁle of top receivers between 2005–2016. tgf = top 10 government
funding receivers; tngf= top 10 neighbor government funding receivers; tpd = top
10 private donation receivers; NGO = non-governmental organizations. Numbers are
mean values and standard deviations are in parentheses. Monetary variables are in
million CNY. Using standard competition ranking (“1224” ranking) and two digits
for numeric precision.
tgf tngf tpd
N 50 46 67
Degree 3.6 (3.3) 5.4 (4.7) 3.1 (3.9)
Direct government funding 56 (110) 25 (120) 1.5 (9.1)
Neighbor government funding 24 (95) 310 (320) 14 (67)
Private donation 4.8 (15) 6.8 (13) 84 (100)
Board size (#people) 18 (6.8) 17 (7.6) 16 (7.0)
#Government oﬃcial on board 2.8 (3.9) 2.9 (7.7) 1.3 (3.9)
%Government-aﬃliated NGO 92% 80% 82%
%Public-fundraising 76% 48% 54%
%Politically sensitive 34% 28% 36%
4.5.2 Regression Analysis
Table 4.15 shows the regression results of pooled ordinary least square and organi-
zation ﬁxed-eﬀect on all three datasets. Because of huge variations, the continuous
variables of regional and organizational control are transformed using the natural
logarithm of one plus original value, while the independent variables (i.e., direct gov-
ernment funding, neighbor government funding, and three centrality measures) and
dependent variables (i.e., private donations made by individuals) are in raw values.
This allows us to control for the impact of extreme values and know the marginal
eﬀect of a one CNY increase in government funding on private donations.
The results of pols and ofe regressions on diﬀerent datasets reveals several patterns
in common. First, all the pols regressions show the coeﬃcients of direct government
funding are statistically signiﬁcant negative. de Wit and Bekkers (2017, p. 309) ﬁnd
that studies using archival or survey data report a mean increase of $0.06 with a 95%
conﬁdence interval between -0.04 and 0.15. Our ﬁnding also lies in this range.
The results of neighbor government funding are surprising: all the regressions show
that the coeﬃcients of neighbor government funding are consistently positive, and
all the ﬁxed eﬀect regressions suggest the coeﬃcients are around 0.4 and statistically
signiﬁcant. In other words, a one CNY increase of government funding to i’s neighbor
organizations is associated with a 0.4 CNY increase in private donations to i.
68
Taken together, the results suggest that, although direct government funding to
organization i may crowd out private donation to i, the government funding to i’s
neighbor organizations can crowd in the private donations to i by a magnitude which
is about three times larger than the crowd-out eﬀect of direct government funding
(p < 0.05). The overall eﬀect of government funding to nonproﬁt organizations is an
increased provision of private donation.
Considering network position, Katz centrality, a variant of eigenvector centrality,
has a negative impact on private donations suggested by all the regressions and is
statistically signiﬁcant in all ofe models. That is to say, by keeping all the other
predictors and controls constant, nodes with higher Katz centrality receive less pri-
vate donations. Nodes with higher Katz centrality values may not be important by
themselves, but they are connected to more inﬂuential nodes in a network (Borgatti,
2005, pp. 61–62). Therefore, a possible explanation is that the inﬂuential nodes at-
tract more ﬂows of private donations, leaving less attention to the nodes tied to them.
In general, all these ﬁndings support our hypothesis that private donations can be
redirected by social relations.
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Table 4.16: Correlation matrix of coeﬃcients of ofe model for pooled dataset.
D N B C K
Direct government funding 1.0
Neighbor government funding −0.25 1.0
Betweenness centrality −0.16 −0.0014 1.0
Closeness centrality 0.057 −0.097 −0.54 1.0
Katz centrality 0.017 −0.0024 −0.70 0.070 1.0
4.5.3 Robustness Analysis
Robustness of the estimations is analyzed from two perspectives: statistical and the-
oretical. Statistical robustness tests include post-estimation analysis and sensitivities
to other omitted variables. Theoretical tests check the robustness of our theoretical
assumptions.
Statistical Robustness
Post-estimation analysis. The correlation matrix of coeﬃcients of ofe models do not
suggest strong correlations between the coeﬃcients (except for betweenness central-
ity). Table 4.16 shows the ofe model for pooled dataset.
Leadership change. Variants in organizational capacity may be time, region, and
organization independent, for example, the personnel changes in fundraising or lead-
ership positions. Previous studies used leadership change as an indicator of variation
in organizational capacity since data of staﬀ mobility at the administrative and exec-
utive level can hardly be obtained (Hansmann & Thomsen, 2017; Ribar & Wilhelm,
2002). This study operationalizes foundation’s leadership change as the turnover of
either executive principal or board chair 25. Statistical tests show that the coeﬃcient
of leadership change is not signiﬁcant, and leadership change has minimal impact on
all the other coeﬃcients (Table A.9 in http://bit.ly/2OByozb).
Theoretical Robustness
Interaction between network eﬀect and revenue ﬂows. Our theoretical assumption
does not consider the interactions between network measures and funding variables
which may skew the estimations. We can examine the impact of interaction by
building the estimations incrementally, that is, starting without network measures
and entering the centrality values singly. As tables in http://bit.ly/2OByozb shows,
25Dummy variable with 0 indicating the same with previous year and 1 otherwise.
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the addition of centrality values has little impact on the coeﬃcients of direct and
neighbor government funding.
Neighbor foundations’ expenditure. Our estimation strategy takes an “input-based
theory,” that is, all the variables measure the resources that ﬂows into foundations
(e.g., government funding and private donations to foundations). Using an “output-
based theory,” neighbor foundations’ outputs (e.g., charitable expenditure) may also
inﬂuence the crowd-out eﬀect (Ribar & Wilhelm, 2002, p. 428). For example, along
with the increase of charitable expenditures from neighbor nonproﬁt a and b, recip-
ients’ demands may be decreased, resulting in the decrease of private donations to
ego nonproﬁt i.
We use weighted neighbor foundations’ total expenditures for charitable purposes
(similar to Eq. 4.2) as one of the output-based OVs. Results show that it has little
impact on all the ofe models (Table A.9 in http://bit.ly/2OByozb), and we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that the coeﬃcient of this variable is equal to zero by Wald
test (p > 0.25).
Operationalization of neighbor government funding. The raw values of neighbor
government funding are weighted by Eq. 4.3 since our theoretical assumption assumes
that the “isomorphicness” between boards in terms of similarity of board composition
matters. We can substitute the weighted values for raw values to examine this as-
sumption. As Table 4.17 shows, the substitution has minimal impact on all the other
independent variables. The coeﬃcients of raw neighbor government funding, although
signiﬁcant, are much smaller than those in Table 4.15, suggesting the eﬀectiveness
and validity of weighting using “isomorphicness.”
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4.6 Conclusion
By using a novel panel dataset across 12 years, this study makes three contributions
to the literature: 1) extending the theory for understanding crowding mechanism by
considering social relations, 2) broadening the scope of research on this topic to one
of the largest countries that has never been examined before, People’s Republic of
China, 3) proposing and testing two modes of crowding mechanism of government
funding using network theory – the compensating mode and amplifying mode. If the
government funding has a direct-crowd-out (in) eﬀect on nonproﬁt i and cross-crowd-
out (in) eﬀect on the isomorphic nonproﬁts a and b that are linked to them through
social relations, the crowding eﬀect is ampliﬁed and therefore named as “amplifying
mode.” By a similar rationale, if the direct- and cross-crowding eﬀects are in diﬀerent
directions, the mechanism is labeled as “compensating mode.”
We ﬁnd the evidence supporting the compensating mode. Although direct gov-
ernment funding to organization i appears to crowd out private donation to i, the
government funding to i’s neighbor organizations appears to crowd in the private do-
nation to i by a larger magnitude, therefore, potentially increase the overall provision
of private donation. The compensating mode provides an important alternative ex-
planation to crowd-out eﬀect of government funding on private donations: the private
donations may not be reduced, but redistributed or even reinforced in the networked
society.
The crowd-in eﬀect of neighbor government funding is surprisingly large compared
to what has been reported. Studies neglecting cross-crowd-out/in and using archival
or survey data report a mean increase of $0.06 with a 95% conﬁdence interval be-
tween -0.04 and 0.15 (de Wit & Bekkers, 2017, p. 309). The number found in this
study (i.e., 0.4), although not directly comparable, is way beyond the 95% conﬁdence
interval. This large coeﬃcient may be the result of high trust in government and
ripple eﬀect. Many studies have reported that the Chinese have strong conﬁdence
in government decision (Lianjiang Li, 2004; Shi, 2001; Z. Wang, 2005; Zhong, 2014),
and the government funding is a positive signal of endorsement. Such endorsement
is especially important in China where political sensitiveness is vital for nonproﬁt’s
survival. When government gives funding to nonproﬁt i, it is not only endorsing non-
proﬁt i but also the service ﬁeld that i operates in. Such signal can increase donors’
conﬁdence in supporting isomorphic nonproﬁts – although individuals may not do-
nate to the nonproﬁts that have been well supported by the government, they can be
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more conﬁdent in supporting similar organizations, and ﬁnally a positive ripple eﬀect
of government funding can be generated from this process.
The network position also matters: if the organization is connected with more
inﬂuential nodes, it receives less private donations because the donation ﬂows may
be attracted by inﬂuential neighbor foundations. For nascent organizations, although
sharing board members and personnel with inﬂuential forerunners is a possible ap-
proach of accessing more resources, it can also put the nascent organizations in dis-
advantaged positions because the inﬂuential foundations may attract more donation
ﬂows, leaving their neighbor organizations less attention. Taken together with the
compensating mode, this evidence supports the hypothesis that the resources can be
redistributed through social relations.
Our ﬁndings have several policy and practical implications. First, it is impor-
tant to establish connections between organizations because the private donations
to nonproﬁts can be redistributed through social relations. Therefore, even though
government funding to an organization can crowd out private donations to the same
organization, this crowd-out eﬀect is more than compensated for by gifts to neigh-
boring organizations. Second, government should support nonproﬁts that are well-
connected because these organizations have more neighbor organizations to which the
private donations can be redirected. Therefore, a stronger ripple eﬀect of government
funding can be generated. Third, for organizations that are interested in having
more private donations, they can establish connections with foundations which re-
ceive large government support, but should be very careful in making friends with
inﬂuential players which are more capable of attracting resource ﬂows, overshadowing
their peers. In general, government should support nonproﬁt sector with conﬁdence
because the increase of government funding will not be undermined by crowd-out
eﬀect if we consider the complex funding system as a whole.
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Chapter 5 Concluding remarks: Towards a holistic network theory of
government–nonproﬁt relationship
This dissertation achieve two goals: 1) Introducing data science methodologies to
nonproﬁt studies; 2) Examining the impact of social relations on nonproﬁts’ social
and economic behaviors. Ultimately, this dissertation provides empirical evidence for
a new paradigm which is just in formation by a few scholars: a holistic network theory
of government–nonproﬁt relationship.
5.1 Dissertation Conclusions
Data scarcity is one of the major barriers in Chinese nonproﬁt studies. In responding
to this issues, Chapter 2 establishes a robust and general-purpose database which
has the potential to support the development of a research topic. It also introduces
the methodology for data management in contemporary quantitative social science.
The normalized database schema consists of three major themes: basic organiza-
tional proﬁle of foundations (i.e., basic proﬁle, board member, supervisor, staﬀ, and
related party tables), program information (i.e., program information, major program,
program relationship, and major recipient tables), and ﬁnancial information (i.e., ﬁ-
nancial position, ﬁnancial activities, cash ﬂow, activity overview, and large donation
tables). The data quality can be measured by four criteria: data source reputation
and credibility, completeness, accuracy, and timeliness. Data records are properly
versioned, allowing veriﬁcation and replication for research purposes.
Based on the database, Chapter 3 approaches the research question of NGO’s au-
tonomy using network theory and ﬁnds the Chinese foundations are board-interlocked
– a practice of sharing board members between diﬀerent organizations. This board
interlock leads to the emergence of an elite group with privileged network positions.
While the presence of government oﬃcials on nonproﬁt boards is widespread, govern-
ment oﬃcials are much less common in a subgroup of foundations that control just
over half of all revenue in the network. This subgroup, associated with business elites,
not only enjoys higher levels of within-elite links, but preferentially excludes govern-
ment oﬃcials from the NGOs with higher degree. The emergence of this structurally
autonomous sphere is associated with major political and social events in the state-
society relationship. Cluster analysis reveals multiple internal components within this
sphere that share similar levels of network inﬂuence. Rather than a core-periphery
structure centered around government oﬃcials, the Chinese nonproﬁt world appears
to be a multi-polar one of distinct elite groups, many of which achieve high levels
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of independence from direct government control. The Chinese nonproﬁt sector also
suggests the existence of autonomous order which has been theorized by political
philosophers and observed in liberal societies.
Chapter 4 reconsiders a classic research question in public economics – the crowd-
out/in eﬀect of government funding on private donations to nonproﬁts. This chapter
proposes an innovative theoretical perspective for understanding the role of social
relations in crowding mechanism: compensating mode and amplifying mode. Anal-
ysis suggests that, although government funding to a nonproﬁt may crowd out the
private donations to the same organization, private donations are not reduced but
redistributed to other nonproﬁts in the organizational network. Our ﬁndings support
the compensating mode and the importance of social relations in resource distribu-
tion. This chapter demonstrates how data science methodologies can help statistical
inference in classic econometrics: it uses standardized data workﬂow to boost the
research life-cycle and uses information extraction techniques to construct structured
dataset from semi-structured raw data ﬁles. By taking the advantage of data science,
this study compiled a novel panel dataset across 12 years.
In general, this dissertation not only provide examples of applying data science
methodologies to nonproﬁt studies, but also provide empirical evidence for building
the theory of nonproﬁt–government relationship by using network theory – a promis-
ing method of analysis and theoretical perspective for constructing a holistic theory
of nonproﬁt–government relationship.
5.2 Future Projects
Based on this dissertation, I plan to continue my research on the theory of nonproﬁt–
government relationship from two approaches: Building data infrastructure and de-
veloping theory through empirical studies.
5.2.1 Building Data Infrastructure
Large-scale social survey. Factual data from annual reports are abundant but not
enough. The next step is to diversify the data type, that is, generate survey data
from large-scale social survey. Several key points of the survey:
1. Focusing on foundations because they are and will be the dominant power in
Chinese nonproﬁt sector for quite a long time.
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2. Using the scholarly networks to generate high quality survey data. As Bian and
Li (2012, pp. 81–82) concluded, there are three strategies for implementing a
large-scale social survey in China: using scholarly networks, collaborating with
government organizations, and contracting out to a survey ﬁrm. According
to their experience, the scholarly networks can generate the data with highest
quality. Building the scholarly network of Chinese nonproﬁt studies is an ongo-
ing eﬀort through the Association for Research on Nonproﬁt Organizations and
Voluntary Action.
Linking data from diﬀerent sources and countries. As more and more data projects
emerge, another trend of these projects is to link data from diﬀerent sources, that is,
identifying the same variables in diﬀerent datasets. Linking data will be very helpful
for cross-national and cross-topic studies.
5.2.2 Developing Theory
This dissertation is only the ﬁrst step towards a holistic theory of nonproﬁt–government
relationship. It adds some interesting observations to existing literature, but still there
is a long way to go to develop a positive holistic theory explaining the nonproﬁt–
government relationship. Two aspects for future studies:
Using people instead of organization as unit of analysis. The two empirical studies
in this dissertation are only able to utilize the information at organizational level. As a
result, they ignore many information at individual level, for example, board member’s
profession (e.g., business, academia, or government oﬃcial). The power structure of
Chinese nonproﬁt sector can be pictured better using data at individual level, and the
studies of power structure in authoritarian countries are essential for understanding
the world political order in the age of transition.
Historical and cultural perspective.What are the relationships between nonproﬁt
sector (variously deﬁned) and government over the 5,000 years of Chinese history?
This question matters because it can help us understand a foundational question
in nonproﬁt studies: why does nonproﬁt sector exist? Most of the literature on
nonproﬁt–government relationship are based on the contemporary observations in
Western countries (J. Ma & Konrath, 2018; Shier & Handy, 2014), there needs to be
diverse, historical, and cultural explanations on this topic to truly put forward our
understanding and quest of a “global civil society.”
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